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Abstract
In financial markets, liquidity is not constant over time but exhibits strong seasonal patterns. In
this article we consider a limit order book model that allows for time-dependent, deterministic depth
and resilience of the book and determine optimal portfolio liquidation strategies. In a first model
variant, we propose a trading dependent spread that increases when market orders are matched
against the order book. In this model no price manipulation occurs and the optimal strategy is of
the wait region - buy region type often encountered in singular control problems. In a second model,
we assume that there is no spread in the order book. Under this assumption we find that price
manipulation can occur, depending on the model parameters. Even in the absence of classical price
manipulation there may be transaction triggered price manipulation. In specific cases, we can state
the optimal strategy in closed form.
KEYWORDS: Market impact model, optimal order execution, limit order book, resilience, time-varying
liquidity, price manipulation, transaction-triggered price manipulation
1 Introduction
Empirical investigations have demonstrated that liquidity varies over time. In particular deterministic
time-of-day and day-of-week liquidity patterns have been found in most markets, see, e.g., Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2001), Kempf and Mayston (2008) and Lorenz and Osterrieder (2009). In spite
of these findings the academic literature on optimal trade execution usually assumes constant liquidity
during the trading time horizon. In this paper we relax this assumption and analyze the effects of
deterministically1 varying liquidity on optimal trade execution for a risk-neutral investor. We characterize
optimal strategies in terms of a trade region and a wait region and find that optimal trading strategies
depend on the expected pattern of time-dependent liquidity. In the case of extreme changes in liquidity,
∗We would like to thank Peter Bank for valuable suggestions.
†Technische Universität Berlin, Germany, fruth@math.tu-berlin.de
‡Deutsche Bank AG, London, UK, schoeneborn@math.tu-berlin.de
§Ulm University, Germany, mikhail.urusov@uni-ulm.de
1Not all changes in liquidity are deterministic; an additional stochastic component has been investigated empirically by,
e.g., Esser and Mönch (2003) and Steinmann (2005). See, e.g., Fruth (2011) for an analysis of the implications of such
stochastic liquidity on optimal trade execution.
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it can even be optimal to entirely refrain from trading in periods of low liquidity. Incorporating such
patterns in trade execution models can hence lower transaction costs.
Time-dependent liquidity can potentially lead to price manipulation. In periods of low liquidity, a trader
could buy the asset and push market prices up significantly; in a subsequent period of higher liquidity,
he might be able to unwind this long position without depressing market prices to their original level,
leaving the trader with a profit after such a round trip trade. In reality such round trip trades are often not
profitable due to the bid-ask spread: once the trader starts buying the asset in large quantities, the spread
widens, resulting in a large cost for the trader when unwinding the position. We propose a model with
trading-dependent spread and demonstrate that price manipulation does not exist in this model in spite
of time-dependent liquidity. In a similar model with fixed zero spread we find that price manipulation or
transaction-triggered price manipulation (a term recently coined by Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko (2011)
and Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b)) can be a consequence of time-dependent liquidity. Phenomena
of such type, i.e. existence of “illusory arbitrages”, which disappear when bid-ask spread is taken into
account, are also observed in different modelling approaches (see e.g. Section 5.1 in Madan and Schoutens
(2011)).
Our liquidity model is based on the limit order book market model of Obizhaeva and Wang (2006), which
models both depth and resilience of the order book explicitly. The instantaneously available liquidity in
the order book is described by the depth. Market orders issued by the large investor are matched with
this liquidity, which increases the spread. Over time, incoming limit orders replenish the order book and
reduce the spread; the speed of this process is determined by the resilience. In our model both depth and
resilience can be independently time dependent. We show that there is a time dependent optimal ratio of
remaining order size to bid-ask spread: If the actual ratio is larger than the optimal ratio, then the trader
is in the “trade region” and it is optimal to reduce the ratio by executing a part of the total order. If the
actual ratio is smaller than the optimal ratio, then the trader is in the “wait region” and it is optimal to
wait for the spread to be reduced by future incoming limit orders before continuing to trade.
Building on empirical investigations of the market impact of large transactions, a number of theoretical
models of illiquid markets have emerged. One part of these market microstructure models focuses on the
underlying mechanisms for illiquidity effects, e.g., Kyle (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). We follow
a second line that takes the liquidity effects as given and derives optimal trading strategies within such
a stylized model market. Two broad types of market models have been proposed for this purpose. First,
several models assume an instantaneous price impact, e.g., Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren and Chriss
(2001) and Almgren (2003). The instantaneous price impact typically combines depth and resilience of
the market into one stylized quantity. Time-dependent liquidity in this setting then leads to executing
the constant liquidity strategy in volume time or liquidity time, and no qualitatively new features occur.
In a second group of models resilience is finite and depth and resilience are separately modelled, e.g.,
Bouchaud, Gefen, Potters, and Wyart (2004), Obizhaeva and Wang (2006), Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied
(2010) and Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011). Our model falls into this last group. Allowing for
independently time-dependent depth and resilience leads to higher technical complexity, but allows us to
capture a wider range of real world phenomena.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the market model
and formulate an optimization problem. In Section 3, we show that this model is free of price manipulation,
which allows us to simplify the model setup and the optimization problem in Section 4. Before we state our
main results on existence, uniqueness and characterization of the optimal trading strategy in Sections 6
to 7, we first provide some elementary properties, like the dimension reduction of our control problem, in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses the case where trading is constrained to discrete time and Section 7 contains
the continuous time case. In Section 8 we investigate under which conditions price manipulation occurs
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in a zero spread model. In some special cases, we can calculate optimal strategies in closed form for our
main model as well as for the zero spread model of Section 8; we provide some examples in Section 9.
Section 10 concludes.
2 Model description
In order to attack the problem of optimal trade execution under time-varying liquidity, we first need to
specify a price impact model in Section 2.1. Our model is based on the work of Obizhaeva and Wang
(2006), but allows for time-varying order book depth and resilience. Furthermore we explicitly model
both sides of the limit order book and thus can allow for strategies that buy and sell at different points
in time. After having introduced the limit order book model, we specify the trader’s objectives in Section
2.2.
2.1 Limit order book and price impact
Trading at most public exchanges is executed through a limit order book, which is a collection of the
limit orders of all market participants in an electronic market. Each limit order has the number of shares,
that the market participant wants to trade, and a price per share attached to it. The price represents a
minimal price in case of a sell and a maximal price in case of a buy order. Compared to a limit order,
a market order does not have an attached price per share, but instead is executed immediately against
the best limit orders waiting in the book. Thus, there is a tradeoff between price saving and immediacy
when using limit and market orders. We refer the reader to Cont, Stoikov, and Talreja (2010) for a more
comprehensive introduction to limit order books.
In this paper we consider a one-asset model that derives its price dynamics from a limit order book that
is exposed to repeated market orders of a large investor (sometimes referred to as the trader). The goal
of the investor is to use market orders2 in order to purchase a large amount x of shares within a certain
time period [0, T ], where T typically ranges from a few hours up to a few trading days. Without loss
of generality we assume that the investor needs to purchase the asset (the sell case is symmetrical) and
hence first describe how buy market orders interact with the ask side of the order book (i.e., with the sell
limit orders contained in the limit order book). Subsequently we turn to the impact of buy market orders
on the bid side and of sell market orders on both sides of the limit order book.
Suppose first that the trader is not active. We assume that the corresponding unaffected best ask price Au
(i.e. the lowest ask price in the limit order book) is a càdlàg martingale on a given filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) satisfying the usual conditions. This unaffected price process is capturing
all external price changes including those due to news as well as due to trading of noise traders and
informed traders. Our model includes in particular the case of the Bachelier model Aut = A
u
0 +σW
A
t with
a (Ft)-Brownian motion WA, as considered in Obizhaeva and Wang (2006). It also includes the driftless
geometric Brownian motion Aut = A
u
0 exp(σW
A
t −
1
2σ
2t), which avoids the counterintuitive negative prices
of the Bachelier model. Moreover, we can allow for jumps in the dynamics of Au.
We now describe the shape of the limit order book, i.e. the pattern of ask prices in the order book. We
follow Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) and assume a block-shaped order book: The number of shares offered
2On this macroscopic time scale, the restriction to market orders is not severe. A subsequent consideration of small time
windows including limit order trading is common practice in banks. See Naujokat and Westray (2011) for a discussion of a
large investor execution problem where both market and limit orders are allowed.
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Figure 1: Snapshot of the block-shaped order book model at time t.
at prices in the interval [Aut , A
u
t +∆A] is given by qt ·∆A with qt > 0 being the order book height (see
Figure 1 for a graphical illustration). Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied (2010) and Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve
(2011) consider order books which are not block shaped and conclude that the optimal execution strategy
of the investor is robust with respect to the order book shape. In our model, we allow the order book
depth qt to be time dependent. As mentioned above, various empirical studies have demonstrated the
time-varying features of liquidity, including order book depth. In theoretical models however, liquidity is
still usually assumed to be constant in time. To our knowledge first attempts to non-constant liquidity
in portfolio liquidation problems has only been considered so far in extensions of the Almgren and Chriss
(2001) model such as Kim and Boyd (2008) and Almgren (2009). In this modelling framework, price
impact is purely temporary and several of the aspects of this paper do not surface.
Let us now turn to the interaction of the investor’s trading with the order book. At time t, the best ask At
might differ from the unaffected best ask Aut due to previous trades of the investor. Define Dt := At−A
u
t
as the price impact or extra spread caused by the past actions of the trader. Suppose that the trader
places a buy market order of ξt > 0 shares. This market order consumes all the shares offered at prices
between the ask price At just prior to order execution and At+ immediately after order execution. At+ is
given by (At+ −At) · qt = ξt and we obtain
Dt+ = Dt + ξt/qt.
See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration.
It is a well established empirical fact that the price impact D exhibits resilience over time. We assume
that the immediate impact ξt/qt can be split into a temporary impact component Ktξt which decays to
zero and a permanent impact component γξt with
γ +Kt = q
−1
t .
We assume that the temporary impact decays exponentially with a fixed time-dependent, deterministic
recovery rate ρt > 0. The price impact at time s ≥ t of a buy market order ξt > 0 placed at time t is
assumed to be
γξt +Kte
−
∫
s
t
ρu duξt.
Notice that this temporary impact model is different to the one which is used, e.g., in Almgren and Chriss
(2001) and Almgren (2003). It slowly decays to zero instead of vanishing immediately and thus prices
depend on previous trades. Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) limit their analysis to a constant decay rate
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ρt ≡ ρ, but suggest the extension to time dependent ρt. Weiss (2010) considers exponential resilience
and shows that the results of Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied (2010) and in particular Obizhaeva and Wang
(2006) can be adapted when the recovery rate depends on the extra spread D caused by the large investor.
Gatheral (2010) considers more general deterministic decay functions than the exponential one in a model
with a potentially non-linear price impact and discusses which combinations of decay function and price
impact yield ’no arbitrage’, i.e. non-negative expected costs of a round trip. Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko
(2011) study the optimal execution problem for more general deterministic decay functions than the
exponential one in a model with constant order book height. For the calibration of resilience see Large
(2007) and for a discussion of a stochastic recovery rate ρ we refer to Fruth (2011).
Let us now discuss the impact of market buy orders on the bid side of the limit order book. According to
the mechanics of the limit order book, a single market buy order ξt directly influences the best ask At+,
but does not influence the best bid price Bt+ = Bt immediately. The best ask At+ recovers over time (in
the absence of any other trading from the investor) on average to At + γξt. In reality market orders only
lead to a temporary widening of the spread. In order to close the spread, Bt needs to move up by γξt
over time and converge to Bt+ γξt, i.e. the buy market order ξt influences the future evolution of B. We
assume that B converges to this new level exponentially with the same rate ρt. The price impact on the
best bid Bs at time s ≥ t of a buy market order ξt > 0 placed at time t is hence
γ
(
1− e−
∫
s
t
ρu du
)
ξt.
We assume that the impact of sell market orders is symmetrical to that of buy market orders. It should
be noted that our model deviates from the existing literature by explicitly modelling both sides of the
order book with a trading dependent spread. For example Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) only model one
side of the order book and restrict trading to this side of the book. Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko (2011),
Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b) and Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011a) on the other hand allow
for trading on both sides of the order book, but assume that there is no spread, i.e. they assume Au = Bu
for unaffected best ask and best bid prices, and that the best bid moves up instantaneously when a market
buy order is matched with the ask side of the book. They find that under this assumption the model
parameters (for example the decay kernel) need to fulfill certain conditions, otherwise price manipulation
arises. We will revisit this topic in Sections 3 and 8.
We can now summarize the dynamics of the best ask At and best bid Bt for general trading strategies
in continuous time. Let Θ and Θ˜ be increasing processes that describe the number of shares which the
investor bought respectively sold from time 0 until time t. We then have
At = A
u
t +Dt,
Bt = B
u
t − Et,
where
Dt = D0e
−
∫
t
0
ρsds +
∫
[0,t)
(
γ +Kse
−
∫
t
s
ρudu
)
dΘs −
∫
[0,t)
γ
(
1− e−
∫
t
s
ρudu
)
dΘ˜s, t ∈ [0, T+], (1)
Et = E0e
−
∫
t
0
ρsds +
∫
[0,t)
(
γ +Kse
−
∫
t
s
ρudu
)
dΘ˜s −
∫
[0,t)
γ
(
1− e−
∫
t
s
ρudu
)
dΘs, t ∈ [0, T+], (2)
with some given nonnegative initial price impacts D0 ≥ 0 and E0 ≥ 0.
Assumption 2.1 (Basic assumptions on Θ, Θ˜, Au, Bu, K, and ρ).
Throughout this paper, we assume the following.
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• The set of admissible strategies is given as
A˜0 :=
{
(Θ, Θ˜) : Ω× [0, T+]→ [0,∞)2 |Θ and Θ˜ are (Ft)-adapted nondecreasing
bounded càglàd processes with (Θ0, Θ˜0) = (0, 0)
}
.
Note that (Θ, Θ˜) may have jumps. In particular, trading in rates and impulse trades are allowed.
• The unaffected best ask price process Au is a càdlàg H1-martingale with a deterministic starting
point Au0 , i.e.
E
√
[Au, Au]T <∞, or, equivalently, E sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Aut | <∞.
The same condition holds for the unaffected best bid price Bu. Furthermore, But ≤ A
u
t for all t ∈
[0, T ].
• The price impact coefficient K : [0, T ] → (0,∞) is a deterministic strictly positive bounded Borel
function.
• The resilience speed ρ : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is a deterministic strictly positive Lebesgue integrable func-
tion.
Remark 2.2.
i) The purchasing componentΘ of a strategy from A˜0 consists of a left-continuous nondecreasing process
(Θt)t∈[0,T ] and an additional random variable ΘT+ with ∆ΘT := ΘT+ − ΘT ≥ 0 being the last
purchase of the strategy. Similarly, for t ∈ [0, T ], we use the notation ∆Θt := Θt+ − Θt. The same
conventions apply for the selling component Θ˜.
ii) The processes D and E depend on (Θ, Θ˜), although this is not explicitly marked in their notation.
iii) As it is often done in the literature on optimal portfolio execution, Θ, Θ˜, D and E are assumed to
be càglàd processes. In (1), the possibility t = T+ is by convention understood as
DT+ = D0e
−
∫
T
0
ρsds +
∫
[0,T ]
(
γ +Kse
−
∫
T
s
ρudu
)
dΘs −
∫
[0,T ]
γe−
∫
T
s
ρududΘ˜s.
A similar convention applies to all other formulas of such type. Furthermore, the integrals of the
form ∫
[0,t)
KsdΘs or
∫
[0,t]
KsdΘs,
are understood as pathwise Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals, i.e. Lebesgue integrals with respect to the
measure with the distribution function s 7→ Θs+.
iv) In the sequel, we need to apply stochastic analysis (e.g. integration by parts or Ito’s formula) to càglàd
processes of finite variation and/or standard semimartingales. This will always be done as follows:
if U is a càglàd process of finite variation, we first consider the process U+ defined by U+t := Ut+ and
then apply standard formulas from stochastic analysis to it. An example (which will be often used
in proofs) is provided in Appendix A.
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2.2 Optimization problem
Let us go ahead by describing the cost minimization problem of the trader. When placing a single buy
market order of size ξt ≥ 0 at time t, he purchases at prices Aut + d, with d ranging from Dt to Dt+, see
Figure 1. Due to the block-shaped limit order book, the total costs of the buy market order amount to
(Aut +Dt) ξt +
Dt+ −Dt
2
ξt = (A
u
t +Dt) ξt +
ξ2t
2qt
= ξt
(
At +
ξt
2qt
)
.
Thus, the total costs of the buy market order are the number of shares ξt times the average price per
share (At +
ξt
2qt
). More generally, the total costs of a strategy (Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0 are given by the formula
C(Θ, Θ˜) :=
∫
[0,T ]
(
At +
∆Θt
2qt
)
dΘt −
∫
[0,T ]
(
Bt −
∆Θ˜t
2qt
)
dΘ˜t.
We now collect all admissible strategies that build up a position of x ∈ [0,∞) shares until time T in the
set
A˜0(x) :=
{
(Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0 |ΘT+ − Θ˜T+ = x a.s.
}
.
Our aim is to minimize the expected execution costs
inf
(Θ,Θ˜)∈A˜0(x)
E C(Θ, Θ˜). (3)
We hence consider the large investor to be risk-neutral and explicitly allow for his optimal strategy to
consist of both buy and sell orders. In the next section, we will see that in our model it is never optimal
to submit sell orders when the overall goal is the purchase of x > 0 shares.
Let us finally note that problem (3) with x ∈ (−∞, 0] is the problem of maximizing the expected proceeds
from liquidation of |x| shares and, due to symmetry in modelling ask and bid sides, can be considered
similarly to problem (3) with x ∈ [0,∞).
3 Market manipulation
Market manipulation has been a concern for price impact models for some time. We now define the
counterparts in our model of the notions of price manipulation in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl
(2004) and of transaction-triggered price manipulation in the sense of Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko (2011)
and Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b). Note that in defining these notions in our model we explicitly
account for the possibility of D0 and E0 being nonzero.
Definition 3.1. A round trip is a strategy from A˜0(0). A price manipulation strategy is a round trip
(Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(0) with strictly negative expected execution costs E C(Θ, Θ˜) < 0. A market impact model
(represented by Au, Bu, K, and ρ) admits price manipulation if there exist D0 ≥ 0, E0 ≥ 0 and
(Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(0) with E C(Θ, Θ˜) < 0.
Definition 3.2. A market impact model (represented by Au, Bu, K, and ρ) admits transaction-triggered
price manipulation if the expected execution costs of a buy (or sell) program can be decreased by inter-
mediate sell (resp. buy) trades. More precisely, this means that there exist x ∈ [0,∞), D0 ≥ 0, E0 ≥ 0
and (Θ0, Θ˜0) ∈ A˜0(x) with
E C(Θ0, Θ˜0) < inf{E C(Θ, 0) | (Θ, 0) ∈ A˜0(x)} (4)
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or there exist x ∈ (−∞, 0], D0 ≥ 0, E0 ≥ 0 and (Θ0, Θ˜0) ∈ A˜0(x) with
E C(Θ0, Θ˜0) < inf{E C(0, Θ˜) | (0, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(x)}. (5)
Clearly, if a model admits price manipulation, then it admits transaction-triggered price manipulation.
But transaction-triggered price manipulation can be present even if price manipulation does not exist in
a model. This situation has been demonstrated in limit order book models with zero bid-ask spread by
Schöneborn (2008) (Chapter 9) in a multi-agent setting and by Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko (2011) in a
setting with non-exponential decay of price impact. In this section, we will show that the limit order book
model introduced in Section 2 is free from both classical and transaction-triggered price manipulation. In
Section 8 we will revisit this topic for a different (but related) limit order book model.
Before attacking the main question of price manipulation in Proposition 3.4, we consider the expected
execution costs of a pure purchasing strategy and verify in Proposition 3.3 that the costs resulting from
changes in the unaffected best ask price are zero and that the costs due to permanent impact are the same
for all strategies.
Proposition 3.3 (Only temporary impact has to be considered).
Let (Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(x) with x ∈ [0,∞) and Θ˜ ≡ 0. Then
E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
At +
∆Θt
2qt
)
dΘt
]
= Au0x+
γ
2
x2 + E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Dγ=0t +
Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
(6)
with
Dγ=0t := D0e
−
∫
t
0
ρsds +
∫
[0,t)
Kse
−
∫
t
s
ρududΘs, t ∈ [0, T+]. (7)
Proof. We start by looking at the expected costs caused by the unaffected best ask price martingale.
Using (48) with U := Θ, Z := Au, the facts that Θ is bounded and that Au is an H1-martingale yield
E
[∫
[0,T ]
Aut dΘt
]
= E [AuTΘT+ −A
u
0Θ0] = A
u
0x. (8)
Let us now turn to the simplification of our optimization problem due to permanent impact. To this end,
we differentiate between the temporary price impact Dγ=0t and the total price impact Dt = D
γ=0
t + γΘt
that we get by adding the permanent impact. Notice that Θ˜ ≡ 0. We can then write
E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Aut +Dt +
∆Θt
2qt
)
dΘt
]
= Au0x+ E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Dγ=0t + γΘt +
γ +Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
= Au0x+ E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Dγ=0t +
Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
+ γE
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Θt +
∆Θt
2
)
dΘt
]
.
The assertion follows, since integration by parts for càglàd processes (see (49) with U = V := Θ) and Θ0 =
0, ΘT+ = x yield ∫
[0,T ]
(
Θt +
∆Θt
2
)
dΘt =
Θ2T+ −Θ
2
0
2
=
x2
2
. (9)
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We can now proceed to prove that our model is free of price manipulation and transaction-triggered price
manipulation.
Proposition 3.4 (Absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation).
In the model of Section 2, there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation. In particular, there is no
price manipulation.
Proof. Consider x ∈ [0,∞) and (Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(x). Making use of
Bt = B
u
t − Et ≤ A
u
t − Et ≤ A
u
t + γ
(
Θt − Θ˜t
)
yields
E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
At +
∆Θt
2qt
)
dΘt
]
− E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Bt −
∆Θ˜t
2qt
)
dΘ˜t
]
≥ E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Aut + γΘt +D
γ=0
t − γΘ˜t +
γ
2
∆Θt +
Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
−E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Aut + γΘt − γΘ˜t −
γ
2
∆Θ˜t −
Kt
2
∆Θ˜t
)
dΘ˜t
]
≥ E
[∫
[0,T ]
Aut d(Θt − Θ˜t)
]
+γE
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Θt − Θ˜t +
∆Θt
2
)
dΘt +
∫
[0,T ]
(
Θ˜t −Θt +
∆Θ˜t
2
)
dΘ˜t
]
+E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Dγ=0t +
Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
.
Analogously to (8), the first of these terms equals Au0x since Θ, Θ˜ are bounded and A
u is anH1-martingale.
For the second one, we do integration by parts (use (49) three times) to deduce∫
[0,T ]
(2Θt +∆Θt) dΘt +
∫
[0,T ]
(
2Θ˜t +∆Θ˜t
)
dΘ˜t − 2
∫
[0,T ]
Θ˜tdΘt − 2
∫
[0,T ]
ΘtdΘ˜t
= Θ2T+ + Θ˜
2
T+ − 2ΘT+Θ˜T+ − 2
∫
[0,T ]
Θ˜tdΘt + 2
∫
[0,T ]
Θ˜t+dΘt ≥
(
ΘT+ − Θ˜T+
)2
= x2.
That is we have shown
E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
At +
∆Θt
2qt
)
dΘt −
∫
[0,T ]
(
Bt −
∆Θ˜t
2qt
)
dΘ˜t
]
≥ Au0x+
γ
2
x2 + E
[∫
[0,T ]
(
Dγ=0t +
Kt
2
∆Θt
)
dΘt
]
and thanks to Proposition 3.3 the right-hand side is larger or equal to the expected execution costs of the
strategy (Θˇ, 0) ∈ A˜0(x) with
Θˇt :=
{
Θt if Θt ≤ x
x otherwise
}
.
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Hence, the expected execution costs of a buy program (Θ, Θ˜) ∈ A˜0(x) containing a selling component is
always greater or equal to the costs of the modified strategy (Θˇ, 0) ∈ A˜0(x) without a selling component.
Thus, (4) does not occur. By a similar reasoning, (5) does not occur as well.
The central economic insight captured in the previous proposition is that price manipulation strategies
can be severely penalized by a widening spread. This idea can easily be applied to different variations of
our model, for example to non-exponential decay kernels as in Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b).
4 Reduction of the optimization problem
Due to Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, we can significantly simplify the optimization problem (3). Let us fix
x ∈ [0,∞). Then it is enough to minimize the expectation in the right-hand side of (6) over the pure
purchasing strategies that build up the position of x shares until time T . That is to say, the problem
in general reduces to that with Au ≡ 0, γ = 0, Θ˜ ≡ 0. Moreover, due to (6), (7) and the fact that K
and ρ are deterministic functions, it is enough to minimize over deterministic purchasing strategies. We
are going to formulate the simplified optimization problem, where we now consider a general initial time
t ∈ [0, T ] because we will use dynamic programming afterwards.
Let us define the following simplified control sets only containing deterministic purchasing strategies:
At :=
{
Θ: [t, T+]→ [0,∞) |Θ is a deterministic
nondecreasing càglàd function with Θt = 0
}
,
At(x) := {Θ ∈ At |ΘT+ = x} .
As above, a strategy from At consists of a left-continuous nondecreasing function (Θs)s∈[t,T ] and an
additional value ΘT+ ∈ [0,∞) with ∆ΘT := ΘT+ − ΘT ≥ 0 being the last purchase of the strategy. For
any fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and δ ∈ [0,∞), we define the cost function J(t, δ, ·) : At → [0,∞) as
J(Θ) := J(t, δ,Θ) :=
∫
[t,T ]
(
Ds +
Ks
2
∆Θs
)
dΘs, (10)
where
Ds := δe
−
∫
s
t
ρudu +
∫
[t,s)
Kue
−
∫
s
u
ρrdrdΘu, s ∈ [t, T+]. (11)
The cost function J represents the total temporary impact costs of the strategyΘ on the time interval [t, T ]
when the initial price impact Dt = δ. Observe that J is well-defined and finite due to Assumption 2.1.
Let us now define the value function for continuous trading time U : [0, T ]× [0,∞)2 → [0,∞) as
U(t, δ, x) := inf
Θ∈At(x)
J(t, δ,Θ). (12)
We also want to discuss discrete trading time, i.e. when trading is only allowed at given times
0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tN = T.
Define n˜(t) := inf{n = 0, ..., N |tn ≥ t}. We then have to constrain our strategy sets to
ANt :=
{
Θ ∈ At |Θs = 0 on [t, tn˜(t)], Θs = Θtn+ on (tn, tn+1] for n = n˜(t), ..., N − 1
}
⊂ At,
ANt (x) :=
{
Θ ∈ ANt |ΘT+ = x
}
⊂ At(x),
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and the value function for discrete trading time becomes
UN (t, δ, x) := inf
Θ∈ANt (x)
J(t, δ,Θ) ≥ U(t, δ, x). (13)
Note that the optimization problems in continuous time (12) and in discrete time (13) only refer to the
ask side of the limit order book. The results for optimal trading strategies that we derive in the following
sections are hence applicable not only to the specific limit order book model introduced in Section 2,
but also to any model which excludes transaction-triggered price manipulation and where the ask price
evolution for pure buying strategies is identical to the ask price evolution in our model. This includes
for example models with different depth of the bid and ask sides of the limit order book, or different
resiliences of the two sides of the book.
We close this section with the following simple result, which shows that our problem is economically
sensible.
Lemma 4.1 (Splitting argument).
Doing two separate trades ξα, ξβ > 0 at the same time s has the same effect as trading at once ξ := ξα+ξβ,
i.e., both alternatives incur the same impact costs and the same impact Ds+.
Proof. The impact costs are in both cases(
Ds +
Ks
2
ξ
)
ξ = Ds (ξα + ξβ) +
Ks
2
(
ξ2α + 2ξαξβ + ξ
2
β
)
=
(
Ds +
Ks
2
ξα
)
ξα +
(
Ds +Ksξα +
Ks
2
ξβ
)
ξβ
and the impact Ds+ = Ds +Ks (ξα + ξβ) after the trade is the same in both cases as well.
5 Preparations
In this section, we first show that in our model optimal strategies are linear in (δ, x), which allows us
to reduce the dimensionality of our problem from three dimensions to two dimensions. Thereafter, we
introduce the concept of WR-BR structure in Section 5.2, which appropriately describes the value function
and optimal execution strategies in our model as we will see in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, we establish
some elementary properties of the value function and optimal strategies in Section 5.3.
In this entire section, we usually refer only to the continuous time setting, for example, to the value
function U . We refer to the discrete time setting only when there is something there to be added explicitly.
But all of the statements in this section hold both in continuous time (i.e. for U) and in discrete time
(i.e. for UN), and we will later use them in both situations.
5.1 Dimension reduction of the value function
In this section, we prove a scaling property of the value function which helps us to reduce the dimension
of our optimization problem. Our approach exploits both the block shape of the limit order book and the
exponential decay of price impact and hence does not generalize easily to more general dynamics of D as,
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e.g., in Predoiu, Shaikhet, and Shreve (2011). We formulate the result for continuous time, although it
also holds for discrete time.
Lemma 5.1 (Optimal strategies scale linearly).
For all a ∈ [0,∞) we have
U(t, aδ, ax) = a2U(t, δ, x). (14)
Furthermore, if Θ∗ ∈ At(x) is optimal for U(t, δ, x), then aΘ∗ ∈ At(ax) is optimal for U(t, aδ, ax).
Proof. The assertion is clear for a = 0. For any a ∈ (0,∞) and Θ ∈ At, we get from (10) and (11) that
J(t, aδ, aΘ) = a2J(t, δ,Θ). (15)
Let Θ∗ ∈ At(x) be optimal for U(t, δ, x) and Θ¯ ∈ At(ax) be optimal for U(t, aδ, ax). If no such optimal
strategies exist, the same arguments can be performed with minimizing sequences of strategies. Using (15)
two times and the optimality of Θ∗, Θ¯, we get
J(t, aδ, Θ¯) ≤ J(t, aδ, aΘ∗) = a2J(t, δ,Θ∗) ≤ a2J
(
t, δ,
1
a
Θ¯
)
= J(t, aδ, Θ¯).
Hence, all inequalities are equalities. Therefore, aΘ∗ is optimal for U(t, aδ, ax) and (14) holds.
For δ > 0, we can take a = 1
δ
and apply Lemma 5.1 to get
U(t, δ, x) = δ2U
(
t, 1,
x
δ
)
= δ2V (t, y) with (16)
y :=
x
δ
,
V (t, y) := U(t, 1, y), V (T, y) = y +
KT
2
y2, V (t, 0) ≡ 0.
In this way we are able to reduce our three-dimensional value function U defined in (12) to a two-
dimensional function V . That is U(t, δfix, x) for some δfix > 0 or U(t, δ, xfix) for some xfix > 0 already
determines the entire value function3. Instead of keeping track of the values x and δ separately, only the
ratio of them is important. It should be noted however that the function V itself is not necessarily the
value function of a modified optimization problem. In a similar way we define the function V N through
the function UN .
5.2 Introduction to buy and wait regions
Let us consider an investor who at time t needs to purchase a position of x > 0 in the remaining time
until T and is facing a limit order book dislocated by Dt = δ ≥ 0. Any trade ξt at time t is decreasing
the number of shares that are still to be bought, but is increasing D at the same time (see Figure 2 for
a graphical representation). In the δ-x-plane, the investor can hence move downwards and to the right.
Note that due to the absence of transaction-triggered price manipulation (as shown in Proposition 3.4)
any intermediate sell orders are suboptimal and hence will not be considered.
3In the following, we will often analyze the function V in order to derive properties of U . Technically this does not
directly allow us to draw conclusions for U(t, 0, x), where δ = 0, since in this case y = x/δ is not defined. The extension
of our proofs to the possibility δ = 0 however is straightforward using continuity arguments (see Proposition 5.5 below) or
alternatively by analyzing V˜ (t, y˜) := U(t, y˜, 1).
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Figure 2: The δ-x-plane for fixed time t.
Intuitively one might expect the large investor to behave as follows: If there are many shares x left to be
bought and the price deviation δ is small, then the large investor would buy some shares immediately. In
the opposite situation, i.e. small x and large δ, he would defer trading and wait for a decrease of the price
deviation due to resilience. We might hence conjecture that the δ-x-plane is divided by a time-dependent
barrier into one buy region above and one wait region below the barrier. Based on the linear scaling
of optimal strategies (Lemma 5.1), we know that if (δ, x) is in the buy region at time t, then, for any
a > 0, (aδ, ax) is also in the buy region. The barrier between the buy and wait regions therefore has
to be a straight line through the origin and the buy and sell region can be characterized in terms of the
ratio y = x
δ
. In this section, we formally introduce the buy and wait regions and the barrier function. In
Sections 6 and 7, we prove that such a barrier exists for discrete and continuous trading time respectively.
In contrast to the case of a time-varying but deterministic illiquidity K considered in this paper, for
stochastic K, this barrier conjecture holds true in many, but not all cases, see Fruth (2011).
We first define the buy and wait regions and subsequently define the barrier function. Based on the above
scaling argument, we can limit our attention to points (1, y) where δ = 1, since for a point (δ, x) with δ > 0
we can instead consider the point (1, x/δ).
Definition 5.2 (Buy and wait region).
For any t ∈ [0, T ], we define the inner buy region as
Brt :=
{
y ∈ (0,∞) | ∃ξ ∈ (0, y) : U(t, 1, y) = U (t, 1 +Ktξ, y − ξ) +
(
1 +
Kt
2
ξ
)
ξ
}
,
and call the following sets the buy region and wait region at time t:
BRt := Brt, WRt := [0,∞) \Brt
(the bar means closure in R).
The inner buy region at time t hence consists of all values y such that immediate buying at the state
(1, y) is value preserving. The wait region on the other hand contains all values y such that any non-zero
purchase at (1, y) destroys value. Let us note that BrT = (0,∞), BRT = [0,∞) and WRT = {0}.
Regarding Definition 5.2, the following comment is in order. We do not claim in this definition that Brt
is an open set. A priori one might imagine, say, the set (10, 20] as the inner buy region at some time
point. But what we can say from the outset is that, due to the splitting argument (see Lemma 4.1), Brt
is in any case a union of (not necessarily open) intervals or the empty set.
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The wait-region/buy-region conjecture can now be formalized as follows.
Definition 5.3 (WR-BR structure).
The value function U has WR-BR structure if there exists a barrier function
c : [0, T ]→ [0,∞]
such that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Brt = (c(t),∞)
with the convention (∞,∞) := ∅. For the value function UN in discrete time to have WR-BR structure,
we only consider t ∈ {t0, ..., tN} and set cN (t) =∞ for t /∈ {t0, ..., tN}.
Let us note that we always have c(T ) = 0. Below we will see that it is indeed possible to have c(t) =∞,
i.e. at time t any strictly positive trade is suboptimal no matter at which state we start. For c(t) < ∞,
having WR-BR structure means that BRt∩WRt = {c(t)}. Figure 3 illustrates the situation in continuous
time.
y
t
0
Barrier
c(t)
Buy BR
WR
T
Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the buy and wait regions in continuous time.
Thus, up to now we have the following intuition. An optimal strategy is suggested by the barrier function
whenever the value function has WR-BR structure. If the position of the large investor at time t satis-
fies x
δ
> c(t), then the portfolio is in the buy region. We then expect that it is optimal to execute the
largest discrete trade ξ ∈ (0, x) such that the new ratio of remaining shares over price deviation x−ξ
δ+Ktξ
is
still in the buy region, i.e. the optimal trade is
ξ∗ =
x− c(t)δ
1 +Ktc(t)
,
which is equivalent to
c(t) =
x− ξ∗
δ +Ktξ∗
.
Notice that the ratio term x−ξ
δ+Ktξ
is strictly decreasing in ξ. Consequently, trades have the effect of
reducing the ratio as indicated in Figure 3, while the resilience effect increases it. That is one trades just
enough shares to keep the ratio y below the barrier.4
In Figure 3 we demonstrate an intuitive case where the barrier decreases over time, i.e. buying becomes
more aggressive as the investor runs out of time. This intuitive feature however does not need to hold for
all possible evolutions of K and ρ as we will see e.g. in Figure 4.
4Intuitively, this implies that apart from a possible initial and final impulse trade, optimal buying occurs in infinitesimal
amounts provided that c is continuous in t on [0, T ). For diffusive K as in Fruth (2011), this would lead to singular optimal
controls.
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Below we will see that the intuition presented above always works in discrete time: namely, the value
function UN always has WR-BR structure, there exists a unique optimal strategy, which is of the type
“trade to the barrier when the ratio is in the buy region, do not trade when it is in the wait region” (see
Section 6). In continuous time the situation is more delicate. It may happen, for example, that the value
function U has WR-BR structure, but the strategy consisting in trading towards the barrier is not optimal
(see the example in the beginning of Section 7, where an optimal strategy does not exist). However, if the
illiquidity K is continuous, there exists an optimal strategy, and, under additional technical assumptions,
it is unique (see Section 7). Moreover, if K and ρ are smooth and satisfy some further technical conditions,
we have explicit formulas for the barrier and for the optimal strategy (see Section 9).
5.3 Some properties of the value function and buy and wait regions
We first state comparative statics satisfied by both the continuous and the discrete time value function.
The value function is increasing in t, δ, x and the price impact coefficient K as well as decreasing with
respect to the resilience speed function.
Proposition 5.4 (Comparative statics for the value function).
a) The value function is nondecreasing in t, δ, x.
b) Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that 0 < Kˇs ≤ Kˆs for all s ∈ [t, T ]. Then the value function corresponding
to Kˇ is less than or equal to the one corresponding to Kˆ.
c) Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that 0 < ρˇs ≤ ρˆs for all s ∈ [t, T ]. Then the value function corresponding to ρˆ
is less than or equal to the one corresponding to ρˇ.
The proof is straightforward.
Proposition 5.5 (Continuity of the value function).
For each t ∈ [0, T ], the functions
U(t, ·, ·) : [0,∞)2 → [0,∞) and V (t, ·) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞)
are continuous.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5.1 it is enough to prove that the function U(t, ·, ·) is continuous. Let us fix
t ∈ [0, T ], x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2, ǫ > 0 and take a strategy Θǫ ∈ At(x) such that
J(t, δ1,Θ
ǫ) < U(t, δ1, x) + ǫ.
For i = 1, 2, we define
Dis := δie
−
∫
s
t
ρudu +
∫
[t,s)
Kue
−
∫
s
u
ρrdrdΘǫu, s ∈ [t, T+].
Using Proposition 5.4, we get
U(t, δ1, x) ≤ U(t, δ2, x) ≤
∫
[t,T ]
(
D2s +
Ks
2
∆Θǫs
)
dΘǫs
≤
∫
[t,T ]
(
D1s +
Ks
2
∆Θǫs
)
dΘǫs + (δ2 − δ1)x
= J(t, δ1,Θ
ǫ) + (δ2 − δ1)x < U(t, δ1, x) + ǫ + (δ2 − δ1)x.
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Thus, for each fixed t ∈ [0, T ] and x ≥ 0, the function U(t, ·, x) is continuous on [0,∞). For t ∈ [0, T ],
δ ≥ 0 and x > 0, by Lemma 5.1, we have
U(t, δ, x) = x2U(t, δ/x, 1),
hence the function U(t, ·, ·) is continuous on [0,∞)× (0,∞). Considering the strategy of buying the whole
position x at time t, we get
U(t, δ, x) ≤
(
δ +
Kt
2
x
)
x −−−→
xց0
0 = U(t, δ, 0),
i.e. the function U(t, ·, ·) is also continuous on [0,∞)× {0}. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.6 (Trading never completes early).
For all t ∈ [0, T ), δ ∈ [0,∞) and x ∈ (0,∞), the value function satisfies
U(t, δ, x) <
(
δ +
Kt
2
x
)
x,
i.e. it is never optimal to buy the whole remaining position at any time t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof. For ǫ ∈ [0, x], define the strategies Θǫ ∈ At(x) that buy (x− ǫ) shares at t and ǫ shares at T . The
corresponding costs are
J (t, δ,Θǫ) =
(
δ +
Kt
2
(x − ǫ)
)
(x− ǫ) +
(
(δ +Kt[x− ǫ]) e
−
∫
T
t
ρsds +
KT
2
ǫ
)
ǫ.
Clearly,
U(t, δ, x) ≤ J
(
t, δ,Θ0
)
=
(
δ +
Kt
2
x
)
x,
but we never have equality since
∂
∂ǫ
J (t, δ,Θǫ)
∣∣∣
ǫ=0
= −
(
1− e−
∫
T
t
ρsds
)
(Ktx+ δ) < 0.
As discussed above, we always have BrT = (0,∞) and WRT = {0}. In two following propositions we
discuss Brt (equivalently, WRt) for t ∈ [0, T ).
Proposition 5.7 (Wait region near 0).
Assume that the value function U has WR-BR structure with the barrier c. Then for any t ∈ [0, T ),
c(t) ∈ (0,∞] (equivalently, there exists ǫ > 0 such that [0, ǫ) ⊂WRt).
Proof. We need to exclude the possibility c(t) = 0, i.e. Brt = (0,∞). But if Brt = (0,∞), we get by
Proposition 5.5 that for any y > 0,
V (t, y) =
(
1 +
Kt
2
y
)
y,
which contradicts Proposition 5.6.
The following result illustrates that the barrier can be infinite.
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Proposition 5.8 (Infinite barrier).
Assume there exist 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T such that
Kse
−
∫
t2
s
ρudu > Kt2 for all s ∈ [t1, t2).
Then Brs = ∅ for s ∈ [t1, t2).
In particular, if the assumption of Proposition 5.8 holds with t1 = 0 and t2 = T , then the value function
has WR-BR structure and the barrier is infinite except at terminal time T .
Proof. For any s ∈ [t1, t2), δ ∈ [0,∞), x ∈ (0,∞) and Θ ∈ As(x) with Θt2 > 0, we get the following
by applying (11), the assumption of the proposition, monotonicity of J in δ, and integration by parts as
in (9)
J (s, δ,Θ) =
∫
[s,t2)
(
Du +
Ku
2
∆Θu
)
dΘu + J
(
t2, Dt2 , (Θu −Θt2)u∈[t2,T+]
)
≥
∫
[s,t2)
(
δe−
∫
u
s
ρrdr +
∫
[s,u)
Kre
−
∫
u
r
ρwdwdΘr +
Ku
2
∆Θu
)
dΘu
+J
(
t2, δe
−
∫
t2
s
ρudu +Kt2Θt2 , (Θu −Θt2)u∈[t2,T+]
)
>
(
δe−
∫
t2
s
ρudu +
Kt2
2
Θt2
)
Θt2 + J
(
t2, δe
−
∫
t2
s
ρudu +Kt2Θt2 , (Θu −Θt2)u∈[t2,T+]
)
.
That is it is strictly suboptimal to trade on [s, t2). In particular, Brs = ∅.
Proposition 5.8 can be extended in the following way.
Proposition 5.9 (Infinite barrier, extended version).
Let K be continuous and assume there exist 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T such that
Kt1e
−
∫ t2
t1
ρudu > Kt2 .
Then Brt1 = ∅.
Proof. Define t˜ as the minimal value of the set
argmin
t∈[t1,t2]
Kte
∫
t
0
ρudu
with t˜ being well-defined due to the continuity of K. Then we know that t˜ > t1. By definition of t˜, we
have that for all t ∈ [t1, t˜)
Kte
∫
t
0
ρudu > Kt˜e
∫
t˜
0
ρudu
and hence
Kte
−
∫
t˜
t
ρudu > Kt˜.
By Proposition 5.8, we can conclude that Brt = ∅ for all t ∈ [t1, t˜) and hence in particular for t = t1.
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6 Discrete time
In this section we show that the optimal execution problem in discrete time has WR-BR structure. Let us
first rephrase the problem in the discrete time setting and define Kn := Ktn , Dn := Dtn and ξn := ∆Θtn
for n = 0, ..., N . The optimization problem (12) can then be expressed as
UN (tn, δ, x) = inf
ξj∈[0,x]∑
ξj=x
N∑
j=n
(
Dj +
Kj
2
ξj
)
ξj . (17)
with Dn = δ and Dj+1 = (Dj +Kjξj)aj , where
aj := exp
(
−
∫ tj+1
tj
ρsds
)
. (18)
Recall the dimension reduction from Lemma 5.1
UN (tn, δ, x) = δ
2V N
(
tn,
x
δ
)
with V N (tn, y) := U
N (tn, 1, y).
The following theorem establishes the WR-BR structure in discrete time.
Theorem 6.1 (Discrete time: WR-BR structure).
The discrete time value function UN has WR-BR structure with some barrier function cN . There exists
a unique optimal strategy, which corresponds to the barrier cN as described in Section 5.2. Furthermore,
V N (tn, ·) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) has the following properties for n = 0, ..., N .
(i) It is continuously differentiable.
(ii) It is piecewise quadratic, i.e., there exists M ∈ N, constants (αi, βi, γi)i=1,...,M and 0 < y1 <
y2 < ... < yM =∞ such that
V N (tn, y) = αm(y)y
2 + βm(y)y + γm(y)
for the index function m : [0,∞)→ {1, ...,M} with m(y) := min{i|y ≤ yi}.
(iii) The coefficients (αi, βi, γi)i=1,...,M from (ii) satisfy the inequalities
αi, βi > 0, (19)
4αiγi + βi − β
2
i ≥ 0,
yi−1βi + 2γi ≥ 0.
The properties (i)–(iii) of V N included in the above theorem will be exploited in the backward induction
proof of the WR-BR structure. The piecewise quadratic nature of the value function occurs, since the
price impact D is affine in the trade size and is multiplied by the trade size in the value function (17).
Let us, however, note that the value function in continuous time is no longer piecewise quadratic.
We prove Theorem 6.1 by backward induction. As a preparation we investigate the relationship of the
function V N at times tn and tn+1. They are linked by the dynamic programming principle:
V N (tn, y) = min
ξ∈[0,y]
{(
1 +
Kn
2
ξ
)
ξ + UN (tn+1, (1 +Knξ)an, y − ξ)
}
= min
ξ∈[0,y]
{(
1 +
Kn
2
ξ
)
ξ + (1 +Knξ)
2a2nV
N
(
tn+1,
y − ξ
(1 +Knξ)an
)}
. (20)
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Instead of focusing on the optimal trade ξ, we can alternatively look for the optimal new ratio η(ξ) :=
y−ξ
1+Knξ
of remaining shares over price deviation. Note that η is decreasing in the trade size ξ and bounded
between zero (if the entire position is traded at once) and the current ratio y (if nothing is traded). A
straightforward calculation confirms that (20) is equivalent to
V N (tn, y) =
1
2Kn
[
(1 +Kny)
2 min
η∈[0,y]
LN (tn, η)− 1
]
, (21)
where
LN(tn, η) :=
1 + 2Kna
2
nV
N (tn+1, ηa
−1
n )
(1 +Knη)2
. (22)
Note that in (21) the minimization is taken over η instead of ξ. Furthermore, the function LN depends
on η, but not on y or ξ separately. In the sequel, the function LN will be essential in several arguments.
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Lemma 6.2. Let a ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0 and let the function v : [0,∞) → [0,∞) satisfy (i), (ii), (iii) given in
Theorem 6.1. Then the following statements hold true.
(a) There exists c∗ ∈ [0,∞] such that
L(y) :=
1 + 2κa2v(ya−1)
(1 + κy)2
, y ∈ [0,∞),
is strictly decreasing for y ∈ [0, c∗) and strictly increasing for y ∈ (c∗,∞).
(b) The function
v˜(y) :=
{
1
2κ
[
(1 + κy)2L(c∗)− 1
]
if y > c∗
a2v(ya−1) otherwise
}
again satisfies (i), (ii), (iii) with possibly different coefficients.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We proceed by backward induction. Notice that V N (tN , y) =
(
1 + KN2 y
)
y ful-
fills (i), (ii), (iii) with M = 1, α1 =
KN
2 , β1 = 1, γ1 = 0. Let us consider the induction step from tn+1 to tn.
We are going to use Lemma 6.2 for a = an, κ = Kn, v = V
N (tn+1, ·). We then have that L = LN (tn, ·)
and we obtain c∗ as the unique minimum of LN (tn, ·) from Lemma 6.2 (a). From (21) we see that the
unique optimal value for η is given by
η∗ := argmin
η∈[0,y]
1
2Kn
[
(1 +Kny)
2LN(tn, η)− 1
]
= min {y, c∗}
and accordingly that the unique optimal trade is given by
ξ∗ := ξ (η∗) = max
{
0,
y − cn
1 +Kncn
}
.
Therefore we have a unique optimal strategy and the value function has WR-BR structure with cN (tn) :=
c∗. Plugging ξ∗ into (20) and applying the definition of V N yields V N (tn, y) = v˜(y). Lemma 6.2 (b) now
concludes the induction step.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. (a) The function L is continuously differentiable with
L′(y) =
2κ
(1 + κy)3
l(y), (23)
l(y) := y
(
2αm(ya−1) − κβm(ya−1)a
)
+
(
βm(ya−1)a− 2κγm(ya−1)a
2 − 1
)
.
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First of all, we show that there is no interval where L is constant. Assume there would be an interval
where l is zero, i.e., there exists i ∈ {1, ...,M} such that (2αi − κβia) = 0 and (βia − 2κγia2 − 1) = 0.
Solving these equations for α respectively γ yields
4αiγi + a
−1βi − β
2
i = 0.
This is a contradiction to (19).
Let us assume l(yˇ) > 0 for some yˇ ∈ [0,∞) with j := m(yˇa−1). We are done if we can conclude
l(yˆ) > 0 for all yˆ ∈ [yˇ,∞). Because of the continuity of l, it is sufficient to show that L keeps increasing
on [yˇ, yj ], i.e., we need to show l(yˆ) > 0 for all yˆ ∈ [yˇ, yj ]. Due to the form of l, this is guaranteed
when 2αj−κβja > 0. Let us suppose that this term would be negative which is equivalent to 2αjβ
−1
j a
−1 ≤
κ. Together with the inequalities from (19) one gets
al(yˇ) = −κ a
(
yˇa−1βj + 2γj
)
+
(
2yˇa−1αj + βj − a
−1
)
≤ −2αjβ
−1
j
(
yˇa−1βj + 2γj
)
+
(
2yˇa−1αj + βj − a
−1
)
= −
1
βj
(
4αjγj + βja
−1 − β2j
)
< 0.
This is a contradiction to l(yˇ) > 0.
(b) If c∗ is finite, the function v˜ is continuously differentiable at c∗ since a brief calculation shows
that v˜′(c∗−) = v˜′(c∗+) is equivalent to l(c∗) = 0. We have
v˜(y) = α˜m˜(y)y
2 + β˜m˜(y)y + γ˜m˜(y),
i.e. v˜ is piecewise quadratic with M˜ = 1 +m(c∗a−1), y˜M˜−1 := c
∗, y˜i := yia for i = 1, ..., M˜ − 2 and
α˜M˜ =
κ
2
L(c∗) > 0, β˜M˜ = L(c
∗) > 0, γ˜M˜ =
L(c∗)− 1
2κ
, (24)
α˜i = αi > 0, β˜i = aβi > 0, γ˜i = a
2γi for i = 1, ..., M˜ − 1.
We therefore get
4α˜iγ˜i + β˜i − β˜
2
i =
{
0 if i = M˜
a2
(
4αiγi + a
−1βi − β2i
)
otherwise
}
≥ 0.
It remains to show that v˜ also inherits the last inequality in (19) from v. For y ≤ c∗,
yβ˜m˜(y) + 2γ˜m˜(y) = a
2
(
ya−1βm(ya−1) + 2γm(ya−1)
)
≥ 0.
Due to v˜ being continuously differentiable in c∗, we get
α˜M˜ (c
∗)2 + β˜M˜c
∗ + γ˜M˜ = α˜M˜−1(c
∗)2 + β˜M˜−1c
∗ + γ˜M˜−1,
2α˜M˜c
∗ + β˜M˜ = 2α˜M˜−1c
∗ + β˜M˜−1.
Taking two times the first equation and subtracting c∗ times the second equation yields
c∗β˜M˜ + 2γ˜M˜ = c
∗β˜M˜−1 + 2γ˜M˜−1.
Since we already know that the right-hand side is positive, also yβ˜M˜ + 2γ˜M˜ ≥ 0 for all y > c
∗.
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We need the following lemma as a preparation for the WR-BR proof in continuous time.
Lemma 6.3. Let K be continuous. Then at least one of two following statements is true:
• The function y 7→ LN (0, y) is convex on
[
0, cN (0)
)
;
• The continuous time buy region is simply Br0 = ∅, i.e. c(0) =∞.
We stress that the first statement in this lemma concerns discrete time, while the second one concerns
the continuous time optimization problem.
Proof. Recall that the definition of LN(0, ·) from (22) contains V N (t1, ·) which is continuously differen-
tiable and piecewise quadratic with coefficients (αi, βi, γi). Analogously to (23), it turns out that
∂
∂y
LN(0, y) =
2K0
(1 +K0y)3
[
y
(
2α
m
(
ye
∫ t1
0 ρsds
) −K0β
m
(
ye
∫ t1
0 ρsds
)e−
∫ t1
0 ρsds
)
+
(
β
m
(
ye
∫ t1
0 ρsds
)e−
∫ t1
0 ρsds + 2K0γ
m
(
ye
∫ t1
0 ρsds
)e−2
∫ t1
0 ρsds − 1
)]
.
We distinguish between two cases. First assume that all i satisfy (2αi−K0βie−
∫ t1
0 ρsds) ≥ 0. Then ∂
∂y
LN (0, ·)
must be increasing on [0, cN(0)) as desired, since LN(0, ·) is decreasing on this interval as we know from
Lemma 6.2.
Assume to the contrary that there exists i such that (2αi −K0βie−
∫ t1
0 ρsds) < 0. Recall how αi and βi
are actually computed in the backward induction of Theorem 6.1. In each induction step, Lemma 6.2 is
used and the coefficients α˜M˜ , β˜M˜ get updated in (24). It gets clear that there exists n ∈ {1, ..., N} such
that
2αi −K0βie
−
∫ t1
0 ρsds =
(
Ktn −K0e
−
∫
tn
0
ρsds
)
LN
(
tn, c
N (tn)
)
.
We get the resilience multiplier e−
∫
tn
0
ρsds thanks to the adjustment β˜i = aβi from the second line of (24).
Due to LN being positive, it follows that
Ktn < K0e
−
∫
tn
0
ρsds.
That is for this choice of K, it cannot be optimal to trade at t = 0 as we see from Proposition 5.9. Hence,
the buy region at t = 0 is the empty set for both discrete and continuous time.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 is constructive. It not only establishes the existence of a unique barrier, but
also provides means to calculate the barrier numerically through the following recursive algorithm.
Initialize value function V N (tN , y) =
(
1 + KN2 y
)
y
For n = N − 1, ..., 0
Set LN (tn, y) :=
1+2Kna
2
nV
N(tn+1,ya−1n )
(1+Kny)
2
Compute cN (tn) := cn := argmin
y≥0
LN(tn, y)
Set V N (tn, y) :=
{
1
2Kn
[
(1 +Kny)
2LN (tn, cn)− 1
]
if y > cn
a2nV
N (tn+1, ya
−1
n ) otherwise
}
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We close this section with a numerical example. Figure 4 was generated using the above numerical scheme
and illustrates the optimal barrier and trading strategy for several example definitions of K and ρ. For
constant K, we recover the Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) “bathtub” strategy with impulse trades of the
same size at the beginning and end of the trading horizon and trading with constant speed in between.
The corresponding barrier is a decreasing straight line as we will explicitly see for continuous time in
Example 9.5. For high values of the resilience ρ, the barriers have the typical decreasing shape, i.e. the
buy region increases if less time to maturity remains. For low values of the resilience ρ, the barrier must
not be decreasing and can even be infinite, i.e. the buy region is the empty set, as illustated for K3 with
less liquidity in the middle than in the beginning and the end of the trading horizon.
7 Continuous time
We now turn to the continuous time setting. In Section 7.1 we discuss existence of optimal strategies using
Helly’s compactness theorem and a uniqueness result using convexity of the value function. Thereafter in
Section 7.2 we prove that the WR-BR result from Section 6 carries over to continuous time.
7.1 Existence of an optimal strategy
In continuous time existence of an optimal strategy is not guaranteed in general. For instance, consider
a constant resilience ρt ≡ ρ > 0 and the price impact parameter K following the Dirichlet-type function
Kt =
{
1 for t rational
2 for t irrational
}
. (25)
In order to analyze model (25), let us first recall that in the model with a constant price impact Kt ≡
κ > 0 there exists a unique optimal strategy, which has a nontrivial absolutely continuous component
(see Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) or Example 9.5 below for explicit formulas). Approximating this strategy
by strategies trading only at rational time points we get that the value function in model (25) coincides
with the value function for the price impact Kt ≡ 1. But there is no strategy in model (25) attaining this
value because the nontrivial absolutely continuous component of the unique optimal strategy for Kt ≡ 1
will count with price impact 2 instead of 1 in the total costs. Thus, there is no optimal strategy in
model (25).5
We can therefore hope to prove existence of optimal strategies only under additional conditions on the
model parameters. In all of Section 7 we will assume that K is continuous; the following theorem asserts
that this is a sufficient condition for existence of an optimal strategy.
Theorem 7.1. (Continuous time: Existence).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be continuous. Then there exists an optimal strategy Θ∗ ∈ At(x), i.e.
J (t, δ,Θ∗) = inf
Θ∈At(x)
J (t, δ,Θ) .
In the proof we construct an optimal strategy as the limit of a sequence of (possibly suboptimal) strategies.
Before we can turn to the proof itself, we need to establish that strategy convergence leads to cost
convergence.
5Let us, however, note that the value function here has WR-BR structure with the barrier from Example 9.5 with κ = 1.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the numerically computed barrier (cN(tn))n=0,...,N and the corresponding optimal
strategy (∆Θtn)n=0,...,N in discrete time for T = 1, N = 10, x = 100, δ = 0, ρ = 2 (left-hand side) and ρ = 10
(right-hand side). We used K1t ≡ 0.7, K
2
t = 1 − 0.6t and K
3
t = 1 − 2.4(t − 0.5)
2 as the given evolution of the
illiquidity.
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Proposition 7.2. (Costs are continuous in the strategy, K continuous).
Let K : [0, T ] → (0,∞) be continuous and let Θ¯, (Θn) be strategies in At(x) with Θn
w
→ Θ¯, i.e.,
limn→∞Θ
n
s = Θ¯s for every point s ∈ [t, T ] of continuity of Θ¯ (i.e. Θ
n converges weakly to Θ¯). Then∣∣J(t, δ, Θ¯)− J(t, δ,Θn)∣∣ −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Note that Proposition 7.2 does not hold when K has a jump. To prove Proposition 7.2, we first show
in Lemma 7.3 that the convergence of the price impact processes follows from the weak convergence of
the corresponding strategies. We then conclude in Lemma 7.5 that Proposition 7.2 holds for absolutely
continuous K. This finally leads to Proposition 7.2 covering all continuous K.
Lemma 7.3. (Price impact process is continuous in the strategy).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be continuous and let Θ¯, (Θn) be strategies in At(x) with Θ
n w→ Θ¯.
Then limn→∞D
n
s = D¯s for s = T+ and for every point s ∈ [t, T ] of continuity of Θ¯.
Proof. Recall equation (11)
Ds =
∫
[t,s)
Kue
−
∫
s
u
ρrdrdΘu + δe
−
∫
s
t
ρudu,
which holds for s = T+ and s ∈ [t, T ]. Due to the weak convergence (note that the total mass is preserved,
i.e. Θ¯T+ = Θ
n
T+ = x, since Θ¯,Θ
n ∈ At(x)) and the integrand being continuous in u, the assertion
follows for s = T+. Due to the weak convergence we also have that for all s ∈ [t, T ] with ∆Θ¯s = 0
and fs(u) := Kue
−
∫
s
u
ρrdrI[t,s)(u) (i.e. fs is continuous dΘ¯-a.e.)
Dns =
∫
[t,T ]
fs(u)dΘ
n
u + δe
−
∫
s
t
ρudu −−−−→
n→∞
∫
[t,T ]
fs(u)dΘ¯u + δe
−
∫
s
t
ρudu = D¯s.
Lemma 7.4. (Costs rewritten in terms of the price impact process).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be absolutely continuous, i.e. Ks = K0 +
∫ s
0
µudu. Then
J(t, δ,Θ) =
1
2
[
D2T+
KT
−
δ2
Kt
+
∫
[t,T ]
(
2ρs
Ks
+
µs
K2s
)
D2sds
]
. (26)
Proof. Applying
dΘs =
dDs + ρsDsds
Ks
, ∆Θs =
∆Ds
Ks
yields
J(t, δ,Θ) =
∫
[t,T ]
(
Ds +
Ks
2
∆Θs
)
dΘs
=
∫
[t,T ]
Ds +
1
2∆Ds
Ks
dDs +
∫
[t,T ]
ρsD
2
s
Ks
ds+
∫
[t,T ]
1
2∆DsρsDs
Ks
ds.
In this expression, the last term is zero since D has only countably many jumps. Using integration by
parts for càglàd processes, namely (49) with U := D, V := D
K
, and d
(
Ds
Ks
)
= 1
Ks
dDs+Dsd
(
1
Ks
)
, we can
write ∫
[t,T ]
Ds
Ks
dDs =
1
2

D2T+
KT
−
δ2
Kt
−
∫
[t,T ]
D2sd
(
1
Ks
)
−
∑
s∈[t,T ]
(∆Ds)
2
Ks

 .
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Plugging in d
(
1
Ks
)
= − µs
K2s
ds yields (26) as desired.
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.3 and Lemma 7.4.
Lemma 7.5. (Costs are continuous in the strategy, K absolutely continuous).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be absolutely continuous and Θ¯, (Θn) be strategies in At(x) with Θ
n w→ Θ¯. Then∣∣J(t, δ, Θ¯)− J(t, δ,Θn)∣∣ −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. We use a proof by contradiction and suppose there exists a subsequence (nj) ⊂ N
such that
lim
j→∞
∫
[t,T ]
(
Dnjs +
Ks
2
∆Θnjs
)
dΘnjs 6=
∫
[t,T ]
(
D¯s +
Ks
2
∆Θ¯s
)
dΘ¯s,
where the limit on the left-hand side exists. Without loss of generality assume
lim
j→∞
∫
[t,T ]
(
Dnjs +
Ks
2
∆Θnjs
)
dΘnjs <
∫
[t,T ]
(
D¯s +
Ks
2
∆Θ¯s
)
dΘ¯s. (27)
We now want to bring Lemma 7.5 into play. For ǫ > 0, we denote by Kǫ : [t, T ] → (0,∞) an absolutely
continuous function such that maxs∈[t,T ] |K
ǫ
s −Ks| ≤ ǫ. For Θ ∈ At(x)∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[t,T ]
(
Dǫs +
Kǫs
2
∆Θs
)
dΘs −
∫
[t,T ]
(
Ds +
Ks
2
∆Θs
)
dΘs
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
[t,T ]
(
|Dǫs −Ds|+
1
2
|Kǫs −Ks|∆Θs
)
dΘs ≤
3
2
x2ǫ.
We therefore get from (27) that there exists ǫ > 0 such that
lim sup
j→∞
∫
[t,T ]
(
Dnj ,ǫs +
Kǫs
2
∆Θnjs
)
dΘnjs <
∫
[t,T ]
(
D¯ǫs +
Kǫs
2
∆Θ¯s
)
dΘ¯s.
This is a contradiction to Lemma 7.5.
We can now conclude the proof of the existence Theorem 7.1.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Let (Θn) ⊂ At(x) be a minimizing sequence. Due to the monotonicity of the
considered strategies, we can use Helly’s Theorem in the form of Theorem 2, §2, Chapter III of Shiryaev
(1995), which also holds for left-continuous processes and on [t, T ] instead of (−∞,∞). It guarantees the
existence of a deterministic Θ¯ ∈ At(x) and a subsequence (nj) ⊂ N such that (Θnj ) converges weakly
to Θ¯. Note that we can always force Θ¯T+ to be x, since weak convergence does not require that Θ
nj
T
converges to Θ¯T whenever Θ¯ has a jump at T . Thanks to Proposition 7.2, we can conclude that
U(t, δ, x) = lim
j→∞
J(t, δ,Θnj) = J(t, δ, Θ¯).
The price impact process D is affine in the corresponding strategy Θ. That is in the case when K is not
decreasing too quickly, Lemma 7.4 guarantees that the cost term J is strictly convex in the strategy Θ.
Therefore, we get the following uniqueness result.
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Theorem 7.6. (Continuous time: Uniqueness).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be absolutely continuous, i.e. Ks = K0 +
∫ s
0
µudu, and additionally
µs + 2ρsKs > 0 a.e. on [0, T ] with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Then there exists a unique optimal strategy.
7.2 WR-BR structure
For continuous K, we have now established existence and (under additional conditions) uniqueness of the
optimal strategy. Let us now turn to the value function in continuous time and demonstrate that it has
WR-BR structure, consistent with our findings in discrete time.
Theorem 7.7. (Continuous time: WR-BR structure).
Let K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) be continuous. Then the value function has WR-BR structure.
We are going to deduce the structural result for the continuous time setting by using our discrete time
result. First, we show that the discrete time value function converges to the continuous time value function.
Without loss of generality, we set t = 0.
Lemma 7.8. (The discrete time value function converges to the continuous time one).
Let K : [0, T ] → (0,∞) be continuous and consider an equidistant time grid with N trading intervals.
Then
lim
N→∞
V N (0, y) = V (0, y).
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 7.1, there exists a continuous time optimal strategy Θ∗ ∈ A0(y). Approximate
it suitably via step functions ΘN ∈ AN0 (y). Then
V (0, y) = J(0, 1,Θ∗) = lim
N→∞
J(0, 1,ΘN) ≥ lim sup
N→∞
V N (0, y).
The inequality V (0, y) ≤ lim infN→∞ V N (0, y) is immediate.
Proof of Theorem 7.7. By the same change of variable from ξ to η that was used in Section 6, we can
transform the optimal trade equation
V (0, y) = min
ξ∈[0,y]
{(
1 +
K0
2
ξ
)
ξ + (1 +K0ξ)
2V
(
0,
y − ξ
1 +K0ξ
)}
into the optimal barrier equation
V (0, y) =
1
2K0
[
(1 +K0y)
2 min
η∈[0,y]
L(0, η)− 1
]
, (28)
where
L(0, y) := L(y) :=
1 + 2K0V (0, y)
(1 +K0y)2
. (29)
Now it follows from (28) and (29) that
min
η∈[0,y]
L(η) = L(y),
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in particular the function L is nonincreasing in y. Define
L˜N(y) := min
η∈[0,y]
LN (0, η),
which is a nonincreasing positive function. If for some N the function y 7→ LN (0, y) is not convex on
[0, cN(0)), then the second alternative in Lemma 6.3 holds, i.e. we have WR-BR structure with c(0) =∞.
Thus, below we assume that for any N the function y 7→ LN(0, y) is convex on [0, cN (0)), hence, by
Lemma 6.2 (a) and Theorem 6.1, the function L˜N is convex on [0,∞). Moreover, by rearranging (21) we
obtain that
L˜N(y) =
1 + 2K0V
N (0, y)
(1 +K0y)2
.
Hence L˜N converges pointwise to L as N →∞ by Lemma 7.8 and (29). Therefore, L is also convex.
Due to L being nonincreasing and convex, there exists a unique c∗ ∈ [0,∞] such that L is strictly decreasing
for y ∈ [0, c∗) and constant for y ∈ (c∗,∞). One can now conclude that for all y > c∗ and η ∈ (c∗, y),
setting ξ := y−η1+K0η , i.e. η =
y−ξ
1+K0ξ
, and using (29) and L(y) = L(η), we have
V (0, y) =
1
2K0
[
(1 +K0y)
2L(y)− 1
]
=
1
2K0
[
(1 +K0y)
2L(η)− 1
]
=
1
2K0
[
(1 +K0y)
2L
(
y − ξ
1 +K0ξ
)
− 1
]
.
We now use the definition of L from (29) once again to get
V (0, y) =
(
1 +
K0
2
ξ
)
ξ + (1 +K0ξ)
2V
(
0,
y − ξ
1 +K0ξ
)
. (30)
Therefore (c∗,∞) ⊂ Br0. In case of c∗ > 0, consider y ≤ c∗, take any η ∈ [0, y), and set ξ :=
y−η
1+K0η
. Then
a similar calculation using that L(y) < L(η) shows that V (0, y) is strictly smaller than the right-hand side
of (30). Hence Br0 = (c
∗,∞). Thus, we get WR-BR structure with c(0) = c∗ ∈ [0,∞] as desired.
In Section 9 we will investigate the value function, barrier function and optimal trading strategies for
several example specifications of K and ρ.
8 Zero spread and price manipulation
In the model introduced in Section 2, we assumed a trading dependent spread between the best ask At
and best bid Bt. This has allowed us to exclude both forms of price manipulation in Section 3. An
alternative assumption that is often made in limit order book models is to disregard the bid-ask spread
and to assume At = Bt, see, for example, Huberman and Stanzl (2004), Gatheral (2010), Alfonsi, Schied,
and Slynko (2011) and Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b). The canonical extension of these models to
our framework including time-varying liquidity is the following.
Assumption 8.1. In the zero spread model, we have the unaffected price Su, which is a càdlàg H1-
martingale with a deterministic starting point Su0 , and assume that the best bid and ask are equal and
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given by A
l
t = B
l
t = S
u
t +D
l
t with
D
l
t = D
l
0e
−
∫
t
0
ρs ds +
∫
[0,t)
Kse
−
∫
t
s
ρu du(dΘs − dΘ˜s), t ∈ [0, T+], (31)
where D
l
0 ∈ R is the initial value for the price impact. For convenience, we will furthermore assume that
K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is twice continuously differentiable and ρ : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is continuously differentiable.
As opposed to this zero spread model, the model introduced in Section 2 will be referred to as the dynamic
spread model in the sequel. In this section we study price manipulation and optimal execution in the zero
spread model. In particular, we provide explicit formulas for optimal strategies. This in turn will be used
in the next section to study explicitly several examples both in the dynamic spread and in the zero spread
model.
We have excluded permanent impact from the definition above (γ = 0). It can easily be included, but,
like in the dynamic spread model, proves to be irrelevant for optimal strategies and price manipulation.
Note that for pure buying strategies (Θ˜ ≡ 0) the zero spread model is identical to the model introduced
in Section 2. The difference between the two models is that if sell orders occur, then they are executed
at the same price as the ask price. Furthermore, buy and sell orders impact this price symmetrically.
We can hence consider the net trading strategy Θl := Θ − Θ˜ instead of buy orders Θ and sell orders Θ˜
separately. The simplification of the stochastic optimization problem of Section 2.2 to a deterministic
problem in Section 4 applies similarly to the zero spread model defined in Assumption 8.1. Thus, for any
fixed x ∈ R, we define the sets of strategies
Al :=
{
Θl : [0, T+]→ R |Θl is a deterministic càglàd
function of finite variation with Θ
l
0 = 0
}
,
Al(x) :=
{
Θl ∈ Al |Θ
l
T+ = x
}
.
Strategies from Al(x) allow buying and selling and build up the position of x shares until time T . We
further define the cost function Jl : R×Al → R as
Jl(Θl) := J(δ,Θl) :=
∫
[0,T ]
(
Dls +
Ks
2
∆Θls
)
dΘls,
where Dl is given by (31) with D
l
0 = δ. The function J
l represents the total temporary impact costs6
in the zero spread model of the strategy Θl on the time interval [0, T ] when the initial price impact
D
l
0 = δ. Observe that J
l is well-defined and finite because K is bounded, which in turn follows from
Assumption 8.1. The value function Ul : R2 → R is then given as
Ul(δ, x) := inf
Θl∈Al(x)
Jl(δ,Θl). (32)
The zero spread model admits price manipulation if, for D
l
0 = 0, there is a profitable round trip, i.e. there
is Θl ∈ Al(0) with Jl(0,Θl) < 0. The zero spread model admits transaction-triggered price manipulation
if, for D
l
0 = 0, the execution costs of a buy (or sell) program can be decreased by intermediate sell
(resp. buy) trades (more precisely, this should be formulated like in Definition 3.2).
6In the case of liquidation of shares (i.e. Θ
l
T+
< 0) the word “costs” should be understood as “minus proceeds from the
liquidation”.
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Remark 8.2. The conceptual difference with Section 3 is that we requireD
l
0 = 0 in these definitions. The
reason is that even in “sensible” zero spread models (that do not admit both types of price manipulation
according to definitions above), we typically have profitable round trips whenever D
l
0 6= 0. In the zero
spread model, the case D
l
0 6= 0 can be interpreted as that the market price is not in its equilibrium state
in the beginning. In the absence of trading the process (D
l
t ) approaches zero due to the resilience, hence
both best ask and best bid price processes (A
l
t ) and (B
l
t ) (which are equal) approach their evolution in
the equilibrium (Sut ). The knowledge of this “direction of deviation from S
u” plus the fact that both buy
and sell orders are executed at the same price7 clearly allow us to construct profitable round trips. For
instance, in the Obizhaeva–Wang-type model with a constant price impact Kt ≡ κ > 0, the strategy
Θls := −
D
l
0
2κ
I(0,ǫ](s), s ∈ [0, T+],
where ǫ ∈ (0, T ], is a profitable round trip whenever D
l
0 6= 0, as can be checked by a straightforward
calculation.
Let us first discuss classical price manipulation in the zero spread model. If the liquidity in the order
book rises too fast (K falls too quickly), then a simple pump and dump strategy becomes attractive. In
the initial low liquidity regime (high K), buying a large amount of shares increases the price significantly.
Quickly thereafter liquidity increases. Then the position can be liquidated with little impact at this
elevated price, leaving the trader with a profit. The following result formalizes this line of thought.
Proposition 8.3. (Price manipulation in the zero spread model).
Assume the zero spread model of Assumption 8.1 and that
K ′t + 2ρtKt < 0 for some t ∈ [0, T ).
Then price manipulation occurs and, for any δ, x ∈ R, there is no optimal strategy in problem (32).
Proof. By the assumption of the theorem,
K ′t = lim
ǫց0
Kt+ǫ −Kt
ǫ
< −2ρtKt = lim
ǫց0
Kt
(
2e−
∫
t+ǫ
t
ρu du − 1
)
−Kt
ǫ
,
hence for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 we have
Kt+ǫ < Kt
(
2e−
∫
t+ǫ
t
ρu du − 1
)
. (33)
Let us consider the round trip Θlm ∈ Al(0), which buys 1 share at time t and sells it at time t+ ǫ, i.e.
Θlms := I(t,t+ǫ](s), s ∈ [0, T+].
A straightforward computation shows that, for D
l
0 = 0, the cost of such a round trip is
Jl(0,Θlm) =
Kt +Kt+ǫ
2
−Kte
−
∫
t+ǫ
t
ρu du.
Due to (33), Jl(0,Θlm) < 0. Thus, price manipulation occurs.
7Let us observe that this does not apply to the dynamic spread model of Section 2, where we have different processes D
and E for the deviations of the best ask and best bid prices from the unaffected ones due to the previous trades.
29
Let us fix δ, x ∈ R, consider a strategy Θl ∈ Al(x), and, for any z ∈ R, define
Θlz := Θl + zΘlm.
Then Θlz ∈ Al(x) and we have
Jl(δ,Θlz) = c0z
2 + c1z + c2
with c0 = J
l(0,Θlm) < 0 and some constants c1 and c2. Since z is arbitrary, we get U
l(δ, x) = −∞.
An optimal strategy is this situation would be a strategy from Al(x) with the cost −∞. But for any
strategy Θl, its cost Jl(δ,Θl) is finite as discussed above, hence there is no optimal strategy in prob-
lem (32).
Interestingly, the conditionK ′t+2ρtKt < 0 for some t in Proposition 8.3 is not symmetric; quickly fallingK
leads to price manipulation, but quickly rising K does not.
If K ′t + 2ρtKt ≥ 0 holds at all points in time, then the situation remains unclear so far. In their model,
Alfonsi, Schied, and Slynko (2011) and Gatheral, Schied, and Slynko (2011b) have shown that even in the
absence of profitable round trip trades, we might still be facing transaction-triggered price manipulation.
This can happen also in our zero spread model. The following theorem provides explicit formulas for
optimal strategies and leads to a characterization of transaction-triggered price manipulation.
Theorem 8.4. (Optimal strategies in the zero spread model).
Assume the zero spread model of Assumption 8.1 and that K ′t + 2ρtKt > 0 on [0, T ]. Define
ft :=
K ′t + ρtKt
K ′t + 2ρtKt
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (34)
Then, for any δ, x ∈ R, the strategy Θl∗ given by the formulas
∆Θ
l∗
0 = δ
l f0
K0
−
δ
K0
, dΘ
l∗
t = δ
l f
′
t + ρtft
Kt
dt, ∆Θ
l∗
T = δ
l 1− fT
KT
(35)
with δl := 1
c
(
x+ δ
K0
)
and
c :=
∫ T
0
f ′t + ρtft
Kt
dt+
f0
K0
+
1− fT
KT
> 0, (36)
is the unique optimal strategy in problem (32). Furthermore, we have
Ul(δ, x) = Jl(δ,Θl∗) = (δl)2
(∫ T
0
(K ′t + 2ρtKt)
f2t
2K2t
dt+
1
2KT
)
−
δ2
2K0
. (37)
Corollary 8.5 (Transaction-triggered price manipulation in the zero spread model).
Under the assumptions of Theorem 8.4 price manipulation does not occur. Furthermore, transaction-
triggered price manipulation occurs if and only if f0 < 0 or f
′
t + ρtft < 0 for some t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Using (35) with δ = 0, we immediately get that price manipulation does not occur. Noting further
that fT < 1, we obtain that transaction-triggered price manipulation occurs if and only if either f0 < 0
or f ′t + ρtft < 0 for some t ∈ [0, T ].
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We can summarize Proposition 8.3 and Corollary 8.5 as follows. If K ′t+2ρtKt < 0 for some t, i.e. liquidity
grows very rapidly, then price manipulation (and hence transaction-triggered price manipulation) occurs.
If K ′t+2ρtKt > 0 everywhere, but f0 < 0 or f
′
t+ρtft < 0 for some t, i.e. liquidity grows fast but not quite
as fast, then price manipulation does not occur, but transaction-triggered price manipulation occurs. If
K ′t+2ρtKt > 0 everywhere, f0 ≥ 0 and f
′
t + ρtft ≥ 0 everywhere, i.e. liquidity never grows too fast, then
neither form of price manipulation occurs and an investor wishing to purchase should only submit buy
orders to the market. Figure 5 illustrates optimal transaction-triggered price manipulation strategies. In
Example 1, the liquidity 1
K
is slightly growing at the end of the trading horizon, which makes the optimal
strategy Θl∗ non-monotonic. As we see in Example 2, the number of shares hold by the large investor
can become negative although the overall goal is to buy a positive amount of shares.
K
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Figure 5: In Example 1, we consider Kt = sin(2.5t) + 0.1 and Kt = sin(10t) + 4 in Example 2. The other
parameters are T = 1, ρ = 2, x = 100, δ = 0. The plots at the bottom illustrate the corresponding optimal
strategies Θl∗ from (35).
In the proof of Theorem 8.4, we are going to exploit the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between Θl and Dl. We rewrite the cost term, which is essentially
∫ T
0
D
l
t dΘ
l
t , in terms of the deviation
process Dl by applying
dΘ
l
t =
dD
l
t + ρtD
l
t dt
Kt
, (38)
and get the following result.
Lemma 8.6 (Costs rewritten in terms of the price impact process).
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Under Assumption 8.1, for any δ ∈ R and Θl ∈ Al, we have
Jl(δ,Θl) =
1
2


(
D
l
T+
)2
KT
−
δ2
K0
+
∫
[0,T ]
(K ′t + 2ρtKt)
(
D
l
t
)2
K2t
dt

 . (39)
The formal proof, where one needs to take into account possible jumps of Θl, is similar to that of
Lemma 7.4.
Similar to Bank and Becherer (2009) and as explained in Gregory and Lin (1996), we can then use the
Euler-Lagrange formalism to find necessary conditions on the optimal Dl. Under our assumptions, these
conditions turn out to be sufficient and the optimal Dl directly gives us an optimal Θl. Unfortunately,
we cannot use the Euler-Lagrange approach directly in the full generality of all strategies in Al, but need
to impose a continuity property. Motivated by the WR-BR structure established in previous sections as
well as the optimal strategy in the case of constant K from Obizhaeva and Wang (2006), we introduce,
for x ∈ R, the set of strategies Alc(x) ⊂ Al(x) with impulse trades at t = 0 and t = T only:
Alc(x) :=
{
Θl ∈ Al(x) |Θl is continuous on (0, T )
}
.
We will also need a notation for a similar set of monotonic strategies, i.e., for y ∈ [0,∞), we define
Ac0(y) :=
{
Θ ∈ A0(y) |Θ is continuous on (0, T )
}
.
Lemma 8.7. (Approximation by continuous strategies).
Assume the zero spread model of Assumption 8.1. Then, for any δ, x ∈ R,
Ul(δ, x) := inf
Θl∈Al(x)
Jl(δ,Θl) = inf
Θl∈Alc(x)
Jl(δ,Θl). (40)
Proof. Let us take any Θl ∈ Al(x) and find Θ, Θ˜ ∈ A0 such that Θl = Θ− Θ˜. We set y := ΘT+ ∈ [0,∞),
y˜ := Θ˜T+ ∈ [0,∞), so that x = y − y˜. Below we will show that
∃Θn ∈ Ac0(y), Θ˜
n ∈ Ac0(y˜) such that Θ
n w−→ Θ, Θ˜n
w
−→ Θ˜. (41)
Let us define Θln := Θn − Θ˜n ∈ Alc(x). It follows from (31) and the weak convergence of the strategies
that the price impact D
ln
t corresponding to Θ
ln converges to the price impact D
l
t corresponding to Θ
l
for t = T+ and for every point t ∈ [0, T ], where both Θ and Θ˜ are continuous (i.e. the convergence of
price impact functions holds at T+ and everywhere on [0, T ] except at most a countable set). By (39),
we get Jl(δ,Θln)→ Jl(δ,Θl) as n→∞. Since Θl ∈ Al(x) was arbitrary, we obtain (40).
It remains to prove (41). Clearly, it is enough to consider some Θ ∈ A0(y) and to construct Θn ∈ Ac0(y)
weakly convergent to Θ. Let P denote the class of all probability measures P on ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) and
Pc =
{
P ∈ P
∣∣P ({s}) = 0 for all s ∈ (0, T )} .
The formula P ([0, s)) := Θs
y
, s ∈ [0, T ], with Θ ∈ A0(y), provides a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween A0(y) and P , where Ac0(y) is mapped on P
c. Thus, it is enough to show that any probability
measure P ∈ P can be weakly approximated by probability measures from Pc. To this end, let us
consider independent random variables ψ and ζ such that Law(ψ) = P and Law(ζ) is continuous. For
any n ∈ N, we define
ψn :=
((
ψ +
ζ
n
)
∨ 0
)
∧ T.
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Then
Qn := Law(ψn) ∈ P
c
and Qn
w
→ P as n→∞ because ψn → ψ a.s. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 8.8. Assume K ′t + 2ρtKt > 0 on [0, T ] and define
χ(t) :=
∫ t
0
f ′s + ρsfs
Ks
dt+
f0
K0
+
1− ft
Kt
.
Then χ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, c = χ(T ) > 0.
Proof. We have
χ(0) =
1
K0
> 0.
Furthermore,
χ′(t) =
f ′t + ρtft
Kt
+
−f ′tKt − (1− ft)K
′
t
K2t
=
ρ2t
K ′t + 2ρtKt
> 0.
Proof of Theorem 8.4. We first note that c from (36) is strictly positive by Lemma 8.8. Also note that if
an optimal strategy in (32) exists, then it is unique in the class Al(x) because the function Θl 7→ Jl(δ,Θl)
is strictly convex on Al (this is due to (39) and the assumption K ′t + 2ρtKt > 0 on [0, T ]).
For the strategy Θl∗ given in (35), we have Θ
l∗
T+ = x as desired. This follows from the formula for δ
l.
Let us further observe that Θl∗ corresponds to the deviation process
D
l∗
0 = δ, D
l∗
t = δ
lft on (0, T ], D
l∗
T+ = δ
l, (42)
which immediately follows from (38) (direct computation using (31) is somewhat longer). A straightfor-
ward calculation gives
Jl(δ,Θl∗) = (δl)2
(∫ T
0
ft
f ′t + ρtft
Kt
dt+
f20
2K0
+
1− f2T
2KT
)
−
δ2
2K0
. (43)
Using integration by parts we get
∫ T
0
ftf
′
t
Kt
dt =
1
2
[
f2T
KT
−
f20
K0
+
∫ T
0
f2t
K2t
K ′t dt
]
.
Substituting this into (43) we get that Jl(δ,Θl∗) equals the right-hand side of (37).
It remains to prove optimality of Θl∗. Due to Lemma 8.7 it is enough to prove that Θl∗ is optimal in the
class Alc(x), which we do below. In terms of Dl∗, the corresponding trading costs are
Jl(δ,Θl∗) =
∫
(0,T )
D
l∗
t dΘ
l∗
t +
(
δ +
K0
2
∆Θ
l∗
0
)
∆Θ
l∗
0 +
(
D
l∗
T +
KT
2
∆Θ
l∗
T
)
∆Θ
l∗
T
=
∫
(0,T )
D
l∗
t
Kt
dD
l∗
t +
∫
(0,T )
ρt(D
l∗
t )
2
Kt
dt+
(D
l∗
0+)
2 − δ2
2K0
+
(D
l∗
T+)
2 − (D
l∗
T )
2
2KT
.
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Let us now look at alternative strategies Θˆ ∈ A
lc
0 (x) with corresponding Dˆ = D
l∗ + h and show that
these alternative strategies cause higher trading costs than Θl∗. That is in the following, we work with
functions h : [0, T+] → R, which are of bounded variation and continuous on (0, T ) with h0 = 0, hT =
limtրT ht and a finite limit h0+ (so that there are possibly jumps (h0+ − h0), (hT+ − hT ) ∈ R). Using
∆Θˆ0 = ∆Θ
l∗
0 +
h0+
K0
, dΘˆt = dΘ
l∗
t +
dht + ρthtdt
Kt
, ∆ΘˆT = ∆Θ
l∗
T +
hT+ − hT
KT
,
a straightforward calculation yields
Jl(δ, Θˆ) =
∫
(0,T )
DˆtdΘˆt +
(
δ +
K0
2
∆Θˆ0
)
∆Θˆ0 +
(
DˆT +
KT
2
∆ΘˆT
)
∆ΘˆT
= Jl(δ,Θl∗) + ∆J1 +∆J2,
∆J1 :=
∫
(0,T )
2ρtD
l∗
t ht
Kt
dt+
∫
(0,T )
ht
Kt
dD
l∗
t +
∫
(0,T )
D
l∗
t
Kt
dht +
D
l∗
0+h0+
K0
+
D
l∗
T+hT+ −D
l∗
T hT
KT
,
∆J2 :=
∫
(0,T )
ρth
2
t
Kt
dt+
∫
(0,T )
ht
Kt
dht +
h20+
2K0
+
h2T+ − h
2
T
2KT
.
Notice that we collect all terms containing Dl∗ in ∆J1. We are now going to finish the proof by showing
that ∆J1 = 0 and ∆J2 > 0 if h does not vanish.
Let us first rewrite ∆J1 exploiting the fact that D
l∗
t = δ
lft, use integration by parts, the definition of f
and again integration by parts to get
∆J1
= δl
{∫
(0,T )
2ρtftht
Kt
dt+
∫
(0,T )
ht
Kt
dft +
∫
(0,T )
ft
Kt
dht +
f0h0+
K0
+
hT+ − fThT
KT
}
= δl
{∫
(0,T )
2ρtKt +K
′
t
K2t
fthtdt+
hT+
KT
}
= δl
{∫
(0,T )
ρtht
Kt
dt+
hT+
KT
+
∫
(0,T )
K ′t
Kt
htdt
}
= δl
{∫
(0,T )
ρtht
Kt
dt+
∫
(0,T )
1
Kt
dht +
h0+
K0
+
hT+ − hT
KT
}
.
Clearly, ∆J1 = 0 whenever δ
l = 0. If δl 6= 0, we have
x =
∫
(0,T )
dΘˆt +∆Θˆ0 +∆ΘˆT
=
(∫
(0,T )
dΘ
l∗
t +∆Θ
l∗
0 +∆Θ
l∗
T
)
+
(∫
(0,T )
ρtht
Kt
dt+
∫
(0,T )
1
Kt
dht +
h0+
K0
+
hT+ − hT
KT
)
= x+
∆J1
δl
.
Therefore ∆J1 = 0. Hence, J
l(δ, Θˆ)−Jl(δ,Θl∗) = ∆J2. Applying integration by parts to the dht integral
yields
∆J2 =
∫
(0,T )
h2t
2Kt
(
2ρt +
K ′t
Kt
)
dt+
h2T+
2KT
.
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Due to the assumption K ′t + 2ρtKt > 0 on [0, T ], we get that ∆J2 is positive as desired.
9 Examples
Let us now turn to explicit examples of dynamics of the price impact parameterK and the resilience ρ. We
can use the formulas derived in the previous section to calculate optimal trading strategies in problem (32)
in the zero spread model. We also want to investigate optimal strategies in problem (12) in the dynamic
spread model introduced in Section 2. In (12) we considered a general initial time t ∈ [0, T ]. Without loss
of generality below we will consider initial time 0 for both models, e.g. we will mean the function U(0, ·, ·)
when speaking about the value function in the dynamic spread model. Further, in the dynamic spread
model we had a nonnegative initial value δ for the deviation of the best ask price from its unaffected level
and considered strategies with the overall goal to buy a nonnegative number of shares x. That is, we
will consider δ, x ∈ [0,∞) in this section when speaking about either model. It is clear that strategy (35)
is optimal also in the dynamic spread model whenever it does not contain selling. Thus, Theorem 8.4,
applied with δ, x ∈ [0,∞), provides us with formulas for the value function and optimal strategy also
in the dynamic spread model whenever there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation in the zero
spread model (see Corollary 8.5) and δ is sufficiently close to 0 (so that ∆Θ
l∗
0 given by the first formula
in (35) is still nonnegative). Furthermore, in this case we get an explicit formula for the barrier function
of Definition 5.3.
Proposition 9.1. (Closed form optimal barrier in the dynamic spread model).
Assume the dynamic spread model of Section 2 and that K : [0, T ] → (0,∞) is twice continuously differ-
entiable and ρ : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is continuously differentiable. Let
K ′t + 2ρtKt > 0 on [0, T ], f0 ≥ 0 and f
′
t + ρtft ≥ 0 on [0, T ], (44)
where f is defined in (34). Then the barrier function of Definition 5.3 is explicitly given by
c(t) =
1
ft
(∫ T
t
f ′s + ρsfs
Ks
ds+
1− fT
KT
)
, t ∈ [0, T ), c(T ) = 0. (45)
Furthermore, for any x ∈ [0,∞) and δ ∈
[
0, x
c(0)
]
, there is a unique optimal strategy in the prob-
lem U(0, δ, x) (see (12)) and it is given by formula (35) in Theorem 8.4, and the value function U(0, δ, x)
equals the right-hand side of (37).
Remark 9.2 (Comments to (45)).
i) First let us note that (44) implies ft ≥ 0 on [0, T ] (see Lemma 9.3 below). Hence the right-hand side
of (45) has the form a/b with a > 0 (note that fT < 1) and b ≥ 0, i.e. c(t) ∈ (0,∞] for t ∈ [0, T ).
The case c(t) =∞ can occur (see e.g. Example 9.6 with ν = −1).
ii) Let us further observe that
lim
tրT
c(t) =
1− fT
fTKT
∈ (0,∞],
i.e. the barrier always jumps at T .
Proof of Proposition 9.1. Let us first notice that c from (36) is strictly positive by Lemma 8.8, so that
Theorem 8.4 applies. Further, it follows from (44) that in the zero spread model with such functions K
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and ρ there is no transaction-triggered price manipulation. Hence, for any x > 0, the optimal strategy Θl∗
from (35) with δ = 0 in the problem Ul(0, x) will also be optimal in the problem U(0, 0, x). Let us recall
that the value c(0) of the barrier is the ratio
x−∆Θl∗0
D
l∗
0+
for the optimal strategy Θl∗ in the problem U(0, 0, x)
and the corresponding Dl∗ (with D
l∗
0 = 0). Thus, we get
c(0) =
x−∆Θ
l∗
0
K0∆Θ
l∗
0
=
1
f0
(∫ T
0
f ′s + ρsfs
Ks
ds+
1− fT
KT
)
.
A similar reasoning applies to an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ). Recall that we always have c(T ) = 0. Finally,
for δ > 0, under condition (44), formula (35) for the zero spread model will give the optimal strategy in
the problem U(0, δ, x) (i.e. for the dynamic spread model) if and only if ∆Θ
l∗
0 ≥ 0. Solving this inequality
with respect to δ we get δ ≤ x
c(0) (note that δ
l from (35) also depends on δ).
Condition (44) ensures the applicability of Theorem 8.4 and additionally excludes transaction-triggered
price manipulation in the zero spread model (see Corollary 8.5). The following result provides an equivalent
form for this condition, which we will use below when studying specific examples.
Lemma 9.3 (An equivalent form for condition (44)).
Assume that K : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is twice continuously differentiable and ρ : [0, T ]→ (0,∞) is continuously
differentiable. Then condition (44) is equivalent to
K ′t + ρtKt ≥ 0 on [0, T ] and f
′
t + ρtft ≥ 0 on [0, T ]. (46)
Proof. Clearly, (46) implies (44). Let us prove the converse. Suppose (44) is satisfied and K ′s + ρsKs < 0
for some s ∈ [0, T ]. Then there exists [u, v] ⊂ [0, T ] such that u < v, fu = 0 and ft < 0 on (u, v]. By the
mean value theorem, there exists w ∈ (u, v) such that f ′w = (fv − fu)/(v − u). Thus, we get f
′
w < 0 and
fw < 0, which contradicts the condition f
′
t + ρtft ≥ 0 on [0, T ].
When we have transaction-triggered price manipulation in the zero spread model, optimal strategies in
the dynamic spread model are different from the ones given in Theorem 8.4. The following proposition
deals with the case of K ′t + ρtKt < 0 for some t (cf. with (46)).
Proposition 9.4. (Wait if decrease of K outweighs resilience).
Assume the dynamic spread model of Section 2. Let, for some t ∈ [0, T ), K be continuously differentiable
at t and ρ continuous at t with K ′t + ρtKt < 0. Then Brt = ∅, i.e., c(t) =∞.
Proof. Since K ′ + ρK is continuous at t, we have K ′s + ρsKs < 0 on an interval around t. Then there
exists ǫ > 0 such that Kse
−
∫
t+ǫ
s
ρudu > Kt+ǫ for all s ∈ [t, t+ ǫ). By Proposition 5.8, it is not optimal to
trade at t.
Let us finally illustrate our results by discussing several examples. For simplicity, take constant re-
silience ρ > 0. Then condition (46) takes the form
K ′t + ρKt ≥ 0 on [0, T ] and K
′′
t + 3ρK
′
t + 2ρ
2Kt ≥ 0 on [0, T ]. (47)
A sufficient condition for (47), which is sometimes convenient (e.g. in Example 9.6 below), is
K ′t + ρKt ≥ 0 on [0, T ] and K
′′
t + ρK
′
t ≥ 0 on [0, T ].
In all examples below we consider δ = 0 and x ∈ [0,∞).
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Example 9.5. (Constant price impact Kt ≡ κ > 0).
Assume that the price impact Kt ≡ κ > 0 is constant. Clearly, condition (47) is satisfied, so we can use
formula (35) to get the optimal strategy in both models. We have ft ≡
1
2 and δ
l = 2κx
ρT+2 . The optimal
strategy in both the dynamic and zero spread models is given by the formula
∆Θ0 = ∆ΘT =
x
ρT + 2
, dΘt =
xρ
ρT + 2
dt,
which recovers the results from Obizhaeva and Wang (2006). The large investor trades with constant
speed on (0, T ) and consumes all fresh limit sell orders entering the book due to resilience in such a way
that the corresponding deviation process Dt is constant on (0, T ] (see (42) and note that ft is constant).
The barrier is linearly decreasing in time (see (45)):
c(t) =
1 + ρ(T − t)
κ
, t ∈ [0, T ), c(T ) = 0.
Let us finally note that the optimal strategy does not depend on κ, while the barrier depends on κ. See
Figure 6 for an illustration.
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Figure 6: Constant price impact (T = 1, ρ = 2, κ = 1, x = 100, δ = 0).
Example 9.6. (Exponential price impact Kt = κe
νρt, κ > 0, ν ∈ R \ {0}).
Assume that the price impact Kt = κe
νρt is growing or falling exponentially with ν ∈ R \ {0} being
the slope of the exponential price impact relative to the resilience. The case ν = 0 was studied in the
previous example. We exclude this case here because some expressions below will take the form 0/0 when
ν = 0 (however, the limits of these expressions as ν → 0 will recover the corresponding formulas from the
previous example). Condition (47) is satisfied if and only if ν ≥ −1. We first consider the case ν ≥ −1.
We have
ft ≡
ν + 1
ν + 2
and δl =
xκν(ν + 2)
(ν + 1)2 − e−νρT
.
In particular, like in the previous example, the large investor trades in such a way that the deviation
process Dt is constant on (0, T ]. The optimal strategy in both the dynamic and zero spread models is
given by the formula
∆Θ0 =
xν(ν + 1)
(ν + 1)2 − e−νρT
, dΘt =
xν(ν + 1)
(ν + 1)2 − e−νρT
ρe−νρt dt, ∆ΘT =
xν
(ν + 1)2 − e−νρT
e−νρT .
We see that, for ν = −1, it is optimal to buy the entire order at T . Vice versa, the initial trade ∆Θ0
approaches x as ν ր∞. The barrier is given by the formula
c(t) =
(ν + 1)e−νρt − e−νρT
κν(ν + 1)
, t ∈ [0, T ), c(T ) = 0
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(in particular, c(t) = ∞ for t ∈ [0, T ) if ν = −1 and the barrier is finite everywhere if ν > −1). For
each ν > −1, the barrier is decreasing in t, i.e. buying becomes more aggressive as the investor runs out
of time. Furthermore, one can check that, for each t ∈ [0, T ), the barrier is decreasing in ν. That is, the
greater is ν, the larger is the buy region since it is less attractive to wait. Like in the previous example,
the optimal strategy does not depend on κ, while the barrier depends on κ.
Let us now consider the case ν < −1. In the zero spread model, transaction-triggered price manipulation
occurs for ν ∈ (−2,−1) (one checks that the assumptions of Theorem 8.4 are satisfied) and classical price
manipulation occurs for ν < −2 (see Proposition 8.3). In the dynamic spread model, for ν < −1, it is
optimal to trade the entire order at T because Kte
−ρ(T−t) > KT for all t ∈ [0, T ) (see Proposition 5.8).
Thus, in the case ν < −1, we have c(t) =∞ for t ∈ [0, T ).
See Figure 7 for an illustration.
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Figure 7: Exponential price impact (T = 1, ρ = 2, κ = 1, x = 100, δ = 0, ν = 0.5 and −1.5 (dashed)).
Example 9.7. (Straight-line price impact Kt = κ+mt, κ > 0, m > −
κ
T
).
Assume that the price impact Kt = κ +mt changes linearly over time. The condition m > −
κ
T
ensures
that K is everywhere strictly positive. Condition (47) is satisfied if and only if m ≥ − 2ρκ3+2ρT . Note that
− 2ρκ3+2ρT > −
κ
T
. Let us first assume that m ≥ − 2ρκ3+2ρT . In this case, the optimal strategy in both the
dynamic and zero spread models is given by the formulas
∆Θ0 =
2m(m+ κρ)x
(m+ 2κρ)m˜
, dΘt =
2mκρ2 (2κρ+m(3 + 2ρt))x
(m+ 2κρ+ 2mρt)
2
m˜
dt,
∆ΘT =
2mκρx
(m+ 2κρ+ 2mρT )m˜
with m˜ := 2m+ κρ log
(
m+ 2κρ+ 2mρT
m+ 2κρ
)
.
The barrier is given by the formula
c(t) = ρ
2m− (m+ 2κρ+ 2mρt) log
(
m+2κρ+2mρt
m+2κρ+2mρT
)
2m(m+ κρ+mρt)
.
In the zero spread model, transaction-triggered price manipulation occurs for m ∈ (− 2ρκ1+2ρT ,−
2ρκ
3+2ρT ) (see
Theorem 8.4) and classical price manipulation occurs for m ∈ (− κ
T
,− 2ρκ1+2ρT ) (see Proposition 8.3). In the
dynamic spread model, we can check by Proposition 5.8 that it is optimal to trade the entire order at T
for
m ∈
(
−
κ
T
,−
κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
))
(see Lemma B.1). We observe that − κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
)
< − 2ρκ3+2ρT (see Lemma B.2). Let us finally note that
the presented methods do not allow us to calculate the optimal strategy in closed form in the dynamic
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spread model for m ∈
[
− κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
)
,− 2ρκ3+2ρT
)
, but we can approximate it numerically in discrete time
(see e.g. the case with Kt = 1− 0.6t, ρ = 2, T = 1 in Figure 4).
See Figure 8 for an illustration.
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Figure 8: Straight-line price impact (T = 1, ρ = 2, κ = 1, x = 100, δ = 0,m = 0.5 and −0.7 (dashed)).
10 Conclusion
Time-varying liquidity is a fundamental property of financial markets. Its implications for optimal liq-
uidation in limit order book markets is the focus of this paper. We find that a model with a dynamic,
trading influenced spread is very robust and free of two types of price manipulation. We prove that value
functions and optimal liquidation strategies in this model are of wait-region/buy-region type, which is
often encountered in problems of singular control. In the literature on optimal trade execution in limit
order books, the spread is often assumed to be zero. Under this assumption we show that time-varying liq-
uidity can lead to classical as well as transaction-triggered price manipulation. For both dynamic and zero
spread assumptions we derive closed form solutions for optimal strategies and provide several examples.
A Integration by parts for càglàd processes
In various proofs in this paper we need to apply stochastic analysis (e.g. integration by parts or Ito’s
formula) to càglàd processes of finite variation and/or standard semimartingales. As noted in Section 2,
this is always done as follows: if U is a càglàd process of finite variation, we first consider the process U+
defined by U+t := Ut+ and then apply standard formulas from stochastic analysis to it. As an example of
such a procedure we provide the following lemma, which is often applied in the proofs in this paper.
Lemma A.1. (Integration by parts).
Let U = (Ut)t∈[0,T+] and V = (Vt)t∈[0,T+] be càglàd processes of finite variation and Z a semimartingale
(in particular càdlàg), which may have a jump at 0. For t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Ut+Zt = U0Z0− +
∫
[0,t]
UsdZs +
∫
[0,t]
ZsdUs, (48)
Ut+Vt+ = U0V0 +
∫
[0,t]
UsdVs +
∫
[0,t]
Vs+dUs. (49)
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Proof. Let X and Y be càdlàg processes (possibly having a jump at 0) with X being a semimartingale
and Y a finite variation process. By Proposition I.4.49 a) in Jacod and Shiryaev (2003), which is a variant
of integration by parts for the case where one of the semimartingales is of finite variation,
XtYt = X0−Y0− +
∫
[0,t]
Ys−dXs +
∫
[0,t]
XsdYs, t ∈ [0, T ]. (50)
Equation (48) is a particular case of (50) applied to X := Z, Y := U+ and equation (49) is a particular
case of (50) applied to X := V +, Y := U+, where U+t := Ut+ and V
+
t := Vt+.
B Technical lemmas used in Example 9.7
Below we use the notation of Example 9.7.
Lemma B.1. For m ∈
(
− κ
T
,− κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
))
we have
(κ+mt)e−ρ(T−t) > κ+mT, t ∈ [0, T ), (51)
i.e. Proposition 5.8 applies.
Proof. Inequality (51) is equivalent to
m < −
κ
(
1− e−ρ(T−t)
)
T − te−ρ(T−t)
.
The assertion now follows from our assumption on m. To see this, we need to show that
−
κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
)
≤ −
κ
(
1− e−ρ(T−t)
)
T − te−ρ(T−t)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
g(t) :=
1− e−ρ(T−t)
T − te−ρ(T−t)
≤
1− e−ρT
T
= g(0).
This is a true statement since 1− x ≤ e−x for all x ∈ R and therefore
g′(t) =
1− ρ(T − t)− e−ρ(T−t)
eρ(T−t)(T − te−ρ(T−t))2
≤ 0.
Lemma B.2. We have − κ
T
(
1− e−ρT
)
< − 2ρκ3+2ρT .
Proof. The statement reduces to proving that 2ρT3+2ρT < 1 − e
−ρT . Setting x := ρT > 0 we see that it is
enough to establish that e−x < 33+2x , which is true as, clearly, e
x > 1 + 23x.
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